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REVERSE LEGAL TRANSPLANTS* 
SITAL KALANTRY** 
In early modern history, laws often moved in one direction—from imperial 
nations to their colonies. In the contemporary era, we would expect legal 
solutions to move in many directions, including from economically weaker 
countries (“Global South” countries) to economically more developed ones 
(“Global North” countries). The legal transplant literature, however, documents 
relatively few transplants from Global South countries to Global North 
countries. There is also little critical analysis in the literature about why there is 
a paucity of “reverse legal transplants”—transplants from Global South 
countries to Global North countries. 
This Article presents a case study of a reverse legal transplant—the movement 
of restrictions on abortion from India to the United States. U.S. statutes 
restricting women from terminating their pregnancies on the basis of the 
predicted sex of the fetus have been enacted in nine states and introduced in over 
half of all state legislatures and the U.S. Congress. The U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Seventh Circuit found those prohibitions to be unconstitutional. The U.S. 
Supreme Court suggested that it would consider adjudicating the 
constitutionality of the statutes after more appeals courts ruled on them. Many 
lawyers, advocates, and others who oppose restrictions on abortion have failed 
to analyze sex-selective abortion statutes correctly. Instead of a human rights 
approach that proposes universal legal solutions, a comparative methodology is 
more appropriate because it leaves room for distinct legal solutions across 
jurisdictions. 
This Article fills several gaps in the transplant literature. First, through an 
analysis of the literature, it finds that scholars have documented few reverse legal 
transplants. Second, it exposes the lack of rigor around the concept of transplants 
and attempts to create relevant definitional boundaries for it. This analysis 
informs the methodology of the literature review and allows us to identify the 
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case study as a reverse legal transplant. Third, this Article contributes to the 
refinement of comparative methodologies to evaluate legal transplants. Articles 
evaluating transplants have measured success after the transplantation has 
already occurred. By limiting their analysis to whether a transplant was properly 
implemented in the reception country, authors have neglected to examine 
whether the law was appropriate to transplant in the first place. This Article 
proposes a multidirectional and contextual approach that can be useful in 
identifying whether a specific law should a priori be transplanted or not. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Laws have migrated from one country to another since early recorded 
history. Powerful and rich imperial nations imposed their laws on weaker 
colonies: the Code of Hammurabi was spread to Mesopotamia,1 German laws 
 
 1. See Jonathan M. Miller, A Typology of Legal Transplants: Using Sociology, Legal History and 
Argentine Examples To Explain the Transplant Process, 51 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 839, 839 (2003) (“Examples 
of the transplant of private law go back at least to the Code of Hammurabi.”). 
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were adopted in parts of South-West Africa,2 and the British imposed a codified 
version of their common law system in their Indian colony.3 Comparative legal 
studies is replete with case studies of these “legal transplants.”4 
In the modern era, laws are not spread by colonizers but are often the work 
of multilateral institutions, foundations, lawyers, and individuals. 5  In some 
cases, people might borrow a law from another country for efficiency 
purposes—it saves time to use existing models.6 
Despite the vast scope of the transplant literature, authors have not 
focused on identifying whether the directional flow of the law and legal 
institutions in the modern era differs from the colonial era. Do laws flow in 
multiple directions now, or is the traffic still one way? People who borrow 
foreign laws for efficiency purposes should be interested in the laws of any 
nation where similar problems have arisen, not just those nations that are more 
or equally economically developed as them. However, a review of over 300 
articles reveals that the literature has only documented laws moving from 
economically powerful to economically weaker nations, rather than in the 
opposite direction, even in the contemporary era.7 
Several reasons have been offered for why laws migrate from countries 
with greater economic power, which I call “Global North countries,” to 
countries with less such power, referred to here as “Global South countries.”8 
“North” and “South” were first used to refer to cardinal directions, 
distinguishing countries with greater economic power in the geographic north 
 
 2. Martin Cai Lockert, Transplanting and Customizing Legal Systems: Lessons from Namibian Legal 
History, 13 RICH. J. GLOB. L. & BUS. 173, 207–08 (2014).  
 3. See Otto Kahn-Freund, On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REV. 1, 16 (1974). 
 4. Miller, supra note 1, at 839. 
 5. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Breaking Out: The Proliferation of Actors in the International System, 
in GLOBAL PRESCRIPTIONS: THE PRODUCTION, EXPORTATION, AND IMPORTATION OF A NEW 
LEGAL ORTHODOXY 12, 19–26 (Yves Dezalay & Bryant G. Garth eds., 2002); see also Toby S. 
Goldbach, Why Legal Transplants, 15 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI. 583, 590 (2019) [hereinafter Goldbach, 
Why Legal Transplants] (pointing out that laws migrate as a result of transnational expert networks, 
international organizations, and private contracting parties); Julie Mertus, From Legal Transplants to 
Transformative Justice: Human Rights and the Promise of Transnational Civil Society, 14 AM. U. INT’L L. 
REV. 1335, 1340 (2011) (focusing on the importance of transnational civil society in norm creation).  
 6. Miller describes this as a “cost-saving transplant.” See Miller, supra note 1, at 845–46. 
 7. See infra Part II. 
 8. I prefer the labels Global North and Global South over “developing” and “developed” 
countries, as the latter terms assume that all countries follow one trajectory and that moving toward 
being a “developed” country is the appropriate trajectory. Cf. Tariq Khokhar & Umar Serajuddin, 
Should We Continue To Use the Term ‘Developing World’?, WORLD BANK BLOGS (Nov. 16, 
2015), https://blogs.worldbank.org/opendata/should-we-continue-use-term-developing-world [https:// 
perma.cc/NP4E-VS83] (arguing that the terms “developed” and “developing” should be phased out). 
Legal transplant scholars have also used other demarcations such as Western/Eastern or 
Center/Periphery. See Máximo Langer, Revolution in Latin American Criminal Procedure: Diffusion of 
Legal Ideas from the Periphery, 55 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 617, 621–26 (2007) [hereinafter Langer, 
Revolution].  
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from countries with less such economic power in the geographic south. In 
today’s world, a demarcation based on cardinal directions is no longer accurate 
since many countries in the geographic global south (on a traditional map) have 
sustained high levels of economic growth. In this Article, I use the terms 
“Global South” and “Global North” in two ways. Primarily, I use them as 
metaphors to categorize countries based on economic strength, regardless of 
geography. A country is either in the Global North or Global South—it cannot 
be in both. For purposes of the literature review in Part II, though, I use the 
terms Global North and Global South to describe the relative economic 
strength of a particular country in relation to the other based on their relative 
GDP per capita. This distinction is made clearer in Section II.A below.  
Some scholars have argued that laws are imposed by Global North 
countries to force Global South countries to reform their economic systems for 
the purpose of foreign economic exploitation.9 Exploitation is not a motive 
behind every transplant from a Global North country to a Global South 
country. People in Global North countries who work on “rule of law projects” 
that export laws to the Global South have more benign motives. However, they 
too often problematically assume that laws connected to economic systems with 
high levels of growth deserve to be spread around the world. Laws of more 
economically powerful nations are thought to be more legally mature and reflect 
“best practices” for others to emulate. 
The North-South traffic in laws is not just attributed to Global North 
actors. Global South actors often independently adopt laws from Global North 
countries without obvious external pressure. For example, authors have 
suggested that Global South policymakers sometimes adopt laws from Global 
North countries to gain legitimacy in order to attract foreign capital (among 
other things). 10 Global South policymakers, lawyers, and other experts who 
have been educated in Global North countries are often at the forefront of 
importing laws.11 
The reasons for the movement of laws from the Global North to the 
Global South have been thoroughly examined and theorized. However, there is 
little discussion in the literature about whether or not laws move from the 
Global South to the Global North. I call laws, institutions, and norms that 
 
 9. See UGO MATTEI & LAURA NADER, PLUNDER: WHEN THE RULE OF LAW IS ILLEGAL 35–
38 (2008). 
 10. Miller calls these “legitimacy-generating” transplants. See Miller, supra note 1, at 854–55.  
 11. Miller calls these “entrepreneurial” transplants. Id. at 850 (“One example of a pure type of 
entrepreneurial transplant would be the individual or individuals who travel abroad to study a particular 
area of law, come home with foreign degrees in the area, establish a law firm or an NGO in the relevant 
field, and then work with legislators to get a law passed modeled on the statute that was the subject of 
the study abroad.”); see also Langer, Revolution, supra note 8, at 619 (describing Latin American 
“entrepreneurs” introducing criminal procedure reforms to domestic institutions).  
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migrate from Global South countries to Global North countries “reverse legal 
transplants.” 
Filling a gap in the literature, this Article presents a case study of a reverse 
legal transplant—sex-selective abortion statutes. Those laws prohibit a person 
from terminating her pregnancy if she is doing so because of the predicted sex 
of the fetus. Limitations on sex selection are regularly introduced in state 
legislatures and the U.S. Congress.12 The question of the constitutionality of 
one state statute reached the U.S. Supreme Court last Term.13 The bills and 
legislative debates surrounding them often make reference to India’s 
restrictions on sex selection and use them as a reason to push for restrictions in 
the United States. Some pro-choice legislators have voted in favor of those 
abortion restrictions even though the laws have a broader restrictive impact on 
abortion. 
 
 12. Restrictions on sex-selective abortion have been introduced in nearly half of all state 
legislatures in the United States. See, e.g., Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of 2015, S. 48, 114th Cong. 
(2015); Assemb. B. 2336, 2013–14 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014); H.B. 15-1162, 70th Gen. Assemb., 1st 
Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2015); S.B. 13-056, 69th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013); H.B. 13-1131, 69th 
Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2013); S.B. 1072, 115th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013); Comm. 
Substitute/H.B. 845, 115th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013); S.B. 529, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 
2010); H.B. 1155, 150th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2010); H.B. 693, 60th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Idaho 
2010); H.B. 3850, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ill. 2019); H.B. 2281, 101st Gen. Assemb., Reg. 
Sess. (Ill. 2019); S.B. 334, 119th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2015); S.B. 183, 118th Gen. 
Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013); H.B. 1430, 118th Gen. Assemb., 1st Reg. Sess. (Ind. 2013); S. File 
44, 86th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2015); S. File 13, 85th Gen. Assemb. (Iowa 2013); H.B. 5, 2019 Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess., 2019 Ky. Acts 156; H.B. 701, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2015); H. 3434, 191st 
Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2019); H. 1567, 188th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2013); H.B. 5731, 96th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Mich. 2012); S. File 1073, 86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010); H. File 1196, 86th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Minn. 2010); S.B. 2767, 2015 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2015); S.B. 2790, 129th Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Miss. 2014); H.B. 771, 100th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2019); H.B. 439, 98th Gen. 
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2015); H.B. 1585, 97th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Mo. 2014); Assemb. 2157, 
215th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.J. 2013); Assemb. 6816, 242d Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2019); Assemb. 6545, 
238th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2015); S. 2286, 237th Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2014); Assemb. 2533, 237th 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2014); H.B. 90, 133d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2019); H.B. 570, 129th 
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Ohio 2012); H.B. 1396, 57th Leg., 1st Sess. (Okla. 2019); S.B. 329, 80th 
Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019); H.B. 3048, 80th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2019); H.B. 3458, 
78th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2015); H.B. 4034, 78th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2014); S.B. 
21, 2019 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2019); S. 2376, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2014); H. 
7383, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (R.I. 2014); S.B. 1033, 86th Leg. Sess. (Tex. 2019); H.B. 2434, 
86th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2019); H.B. 113, 84th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2015); H.B. 309, 83d Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2013); H.B. 98, 2014 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Va. 2014); H.B. 2031, 82d Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (W. Va. 2015); H.B. 2371, 81st Leg., Reg. Sess. (W. Va. 2014); S.B. 173, 104th Leg., Reg. Sess. 
(Wis. 2019); Assemb. B. 182, 104th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2019); S.B. 201, 101st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 
2014); Assemb. B. 217, 101st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wis. 2014). 
 13. While the U.S. Supreme Court refused to review the constitutionality of a sex-selective 
abortion statute last year, the Court suggests that it will conduct a review once more lower courts have 
addressed the issue. See Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1782 
(2019). 
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Universalist human rights approaches often inform advocacy on 
reproductive rights.14 An extreme version of that position calls for universal 
legal solutions to similar human rights problems that arise around the world. 
The alternative to universalism—cultural relativism—suggests that it is not 
possible nor normatively desirable for legal solutions to be uniform across 
jurisdictions.15 Countries have used this viewpoint to permit obvious human 
rights abuses. Comparative law methods provide an exit to this intractable 
debate in international law. Context-sensitive comparative law methods do not 
assume that legal solutions are applicable across borders (unlike universalism), 
yet they do not reject that possibility (unlike cultural relativism). 16  The 
comparative analysis presented here of sex-selective abortion laws in the United 
States and India could inform the way in which U.S. legislators and judges 
approach those laws. 
Scholarship on the movement of laws has not articulated robust methods 
to examine when, a priori, it is appropriate for one country to borrow laws or 
legal institutions from another country. Under the banner of the “law and 
development” movement, American scholars transplanted U.S. law in the 1960s 
and 1970s until the legal academy began to reject such transfers. 17  The 
scholarship critiquing the law and development movement called for the 
abandonment of the project of transplantation. As a result, the critics did not 
develop a methodology to determine when it would be appropriate to transplant 
a law in practice.18 
A more recent strand of the transplant literature geared toward 
determining what makes a transplant successful has also neglected to present a 
framework to determine whether it is appropriate to transplant the law in the 
first place. 19  In those studies, success is defined as whether people and 
institutions in the reception country implement laws or, to put it another way, 
whether the laws have “adapted . . . to local conditions.”20 There should be a 
broader definition of success. The question should not be whether the laws will 
“take hold” but whether they will serve the same purposes and have the same 
impact in the reception country as they did in the country where they were 
developed. 
 
 14. See infra notes 167–84 and accompanying text. 
 15. See infra notes 185–89 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra Section V.A. 
 17. See, e.g., David M. Trubek & Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on 
the Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 WIS. L. REV. 1062, 1064, 1080 
(describing “malaise” brought on by doubts about the social utility of law and development within the 
legal academic field).  
 18. See id.  
 19. Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, The Transplant Effect, 51 AM. J. 
COMPAR. L. 163, 167 (2003). 
 20. Id.  
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The comparative approach presented here helps to develop a robust 
methodology for studying any type of transplant regardless of the economic 
strength of the country in which it originated or the economic development of 
the receiving country. Studies aimed at identifying what makes transplants 
successful have tended to focus only on factors in the receiving country.21 The 
comparative analysis of sex-selective abortion laws reveals that the purpose, 
scope, consequences, and other factors in the country of origin of a transplant 
matter a great deal to determining whether a transplant is appropriate in the 
receiving country. 
One challenge to defining a reverse legal transplant is that there is no 
consensus or attempt made in the literature to identify what constitutes a legal 
transplant. Is something considered a transplant only if it moves between 
nations, or do intra-nation borrowings count as legal transplants? Is the use of 
foreign precedent by judges a transplant? This Article outlines a set of 
characteristics of modern legal transplants to guide the literature review and 
identify the features of the case study that qualify it as a transplant. 
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I provides an overview of the 
evolution of the term “legal transplant” in the scholarship and a historical 
overview of transplants in practice. Section I.B fills a gap in the literature by 
identifying a set of characteristics of legal transplants and explaining where 
there are points of consensus and grey areas in the definition. 
Part II examines whether, in the modern era, the movement of laws is 
connected to the relative economic power of nations. Through a study of the 
transplant literature (Section II.A), this Article finds that most transplants 
documented in the literature observe movements from economically powerful 
countries to countries with lower levels of economic development (Section 
II.B). 
This Article argues that limitations on sex-selective abortion are an 
example of a reverse legal transplant. Section III.A documents the proliferation 
of sex-selective abortion statutes in the United States. Section III.B explains 
why those laws are reverse legal transplants by demonstrating that they satisfy 
the characteristics of transplants. 
Indian feminists pushed for restrictions on a woman’s ability to abort a 
fetus on the basis of its sex, and similar restrictions are being advocated by pro-
life groups in the United States. Initially, when they were introduced, pro-
choice representatives were unsure about how to react to the laws. Section IV.A 
demonstrates that some pro-choice legislative representatives even voted in 
favor of sex-selective abortion restrictions. Section IV.B explains that this lack 
of clarity on the part of pro-choice people stems from using a universalist human 
rights lens to understand the prohibitions. A comparative approach presents a 
 
 21. See infra Section V.A. 
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path forward out of the universalist/cultural relativist debate in international 
law. 
In evaluating sex-selective abortion laws in the United States and India, 
Section V.A exposes certain limitations of traditional comparative approaches. 
Authors who have studied what makes transplants succeed and fail often neglect 
to consider why the laws were enacted in the origin country and what behaviors 
they sought to address. This might be because they take for granted that laws 
of Global North countries are legally mature or reflect best practices. Section 
V.B applies a multidirectional and contextual comparative methodology to sex-
selective abortion law in India and the United States. 
I.  LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 
Legal transplants have been the subject of significant scholarship within 
comparative law.22 Section I.A. below explains the genesis of the term and the 
evolution of the modes of migration of transplants over time. Despite the 
enormous scope of the legal transplant literature, authors have not agreed on a 
definition of legal transplant. In Section I.B below, I identify key traits of 
transplants. This framework then provides appropriate parameters to guide the 
literature review in Part II and identify sex selective abortion statutes as reverse 
legal transplants in Part III.  
A. Legal Transplants: Theory and Practice 
Legal transplants generally refer to legal regimes, laws, legal policies, or 
legal rules that travel from one jurisdiction or legal system to another.23 In early 
history, transplants were imposed by imperial rulers in their conquered 
territory. For example, French and Spanish laws were transported to what is 
now Louisiana, and British laws were spread to its colonies.24 A wave of legal 
transplants started after World War II when the victorious countries rewrote 
 
 22. A search of the online database HeinOnline for the phrase “legal transplants” results in 3,790 
articles. HEINONLINE, https://home.heinonline.org [https://perma.cc/3VZY-JKFW] (search in search 
bar for “legal transplants”) (search conducted Aug. 10, 2020). 
 23. See Goldbach, Why Legal Transplants, supra note 5, at 584. The term “legal transplants” is often 
attributed to a debate between Alan Watson and Otto Kahn-Freund. See Alan Watson, Legal 
Transplants and Law Reform, 92 L.Q. REV. 79, 81 (1976); infra notes 205–13 and accompanying text. 
 24. See Goldbach, Why Legal Transplants, supra note 5, at 586. Valerie Hans observes that: 
The classic common law jury that was borrowed, transplanted, and translated in its new 
Argentine context was itself the product of a long line of successive transplantations across 
legal systems. Developing as a dispute resolution mechanism in medieval England, the English 
jury came to be considered as, in Blackstone’s words, “the glory of the English law.” 
Valerie Hans, Trial by Jury: Story of a Legal Transplant, 51 L. & SOC’Y REV. 471, 479 (2017). 
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the constitutions of the defeated.25 The popularity of transferring legal systems 
from powerful countries to less powerful countries again saw a resurgence in 
the 1960s and 1970s when legal academics, development agencies, and lawyers 
transplanted laws and legal concepts from “developed countries” to “developing 
countries.”26 
That project, known as the law and development movement, was 
eventually abandoned by the legal academy. Scholars came to question the view 
that exporting liberal legalist models of law based on the U.S. legal system 
would improve economic development in other countries.27 First, scholars who 
engaged in this work had little empirical knowledge about the countries whose 
legal systems they were designing.28 But as they began their work in those 
countries, they soon realized the mismatch between their models and the 
empirical reality in the developing country. 29  Second, the lawyer-scholars 
realized that the liberal legalist model might not even accurately describe the 
legal system in the United States.30 Third, there were doubts that the U.S. 
model was in fact appropriate to claim as the ideal.31 Finally, the liberal legalist 
model developed in the United States was not suitable for countries around the 
world that did not have formal court systems or where pluralist notions of law 
prevailed.32 The critics of the law and development movement were resigned to 
abandoning the law reform project. Consequently, they did not build a 
methodology to provide guidance to lawyers and other advocates interested in 
exporting or importing laws. 
Ignoring earlier warnings,33 a new resurgence of legal transplants began in 
the 1990s, but with less involvement from legal academia. 34  Laws were 
transplanted, for example, by lawyers drafting constitutions for newly 
democratic countries and by nongovernmental organizations working to 
 
 25. See Mertus, supra note 5, at 1378; see also Louis F. Del Duca & Alain A. Levasseur, Impact of 
Legal Cultural and Legal Transplants on the Evolution of the U.S. Legal System, 58 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 1, 
29 (2010) (tracing the history of transplantation from British and French law to the United States). 
 26. See JAMES A. GARDNER, LEGAL IMPERIALISM: AMERICAN LAWYERS AND FOREIGN AID 
IN LATIN AMERICA 6–8, 12 (1980). 
 27. See Trubek & Galanter, supra note 17, at 1080. 
 28. Id. at 1090. 
 29. Id.  
 30. See id. at 1081, 1090–91.  
 31. See id. at 1091–92.  
 32. See id. at 1071.  
 33. William Twining, Diffusion of Law: A Global Perspective, 49 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & 
UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 32 (2004) [hereinafter Twining, Diffusion of Law]; see also Mertus, supra note 5, at 
1380 (“Whether the lessons of the law and development movement were heard is questionable.”). 
 34. Goldbach notes that legal reforms in the 1990s included strengthening court administration, 
drafting alternative dispute resolution mechanisms, and establishing bankruptcy and other court 
systems. See Goldbach, Why Legal Transplants, supra note 5, at 586. 
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promote legal reform.35 In this era, not only were legal rules transplanted, but 
legal institutions, such as courts, were also strengthened.36 Those activities were 
largely driven by economists and other nonlawyers working with practicing 
(rather than academic) lawyers.37 
The legal transplants observed during the modern waves were driven not 
solely by governments but also by multilateral institutions (such as the World 
Bank) and foundations hoping that legal systems tied to economically powerful 
countries would lay the foundation for economic growth when exported to less 
developed countries.38 
Comparative law scholars point out that, even today, economically 
powerful countries use law as a way to plunder less powerful countries. Under 
the guise of “rule of law,” powerful countries and the institutions they control 
force Global South countries to adopt laws that allow for Global North 
countries to devastate them economically.39 While this critique is valid, not all 
transplants manifest this kind of ulterior motive. Some Global North actors 
transplant laws because they genuinely believe they will benefit Global South 
economies. Furthermore, Global South actors sometimes voluntarily borrow 
laws as a ruse to gain legitimacy among multinational organizations.40 
Scholars have presented numerous theories about why laws flow from 
Global North nations to Global South nations, but there is little discussion in 
the literature about the reverse movement. In the contemporary era, actors in 
all countries have access to the laws of other countries through the internet. 
This access allows individuals, governments, and groups to evaluate laws from 
other countries as potential models for their own countries. 41  Yet, as 
demonstrated in Part II below, the literature does not appear to document 
movements from Global South countries to Global North countries. 
 
 35. See Lis Wiehl, Constitution, Anyone? A New Cottage Industry, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 1990), 
https://timesmachine.nytimes.com/timesmachine/1990/02/02/issue.html [https://perma.cc/WU6U-
ZYV7 (dark archive)]. 
 36. See Goldbach, Why Legal Transplants, supra note 5, at 586.  
 37. See Wiehl, supra note 35. But see the well-known example of Noah Feldman, now law 
professor at Harvard Law School, who assisted in drafting the Iraqi constitution. Madeleine Brand, 
Next Steps for Iraq’s Constitution Authors, NPR (Aug. 23, 2005, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=4811914 [https://perma.cc/L4GC-YZXE]. 
 38. Under Miller’s typology, these would be “externally dictated” transplants. Miller, supra note 
1, at 847.  
 39. MATTEI & NADER, supra note 9, at 35–38.  
 40. Miller, supra note 1, at 840. 
 41. See generally STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY 223–24 
(1999) (discussing how Global South countries have adopted political practices of the Global North for 
recognition of international legal sovereignty); see also GARDNER, supra note 26, at 12 (describing how 
the American legal assistance began to change as its perspective shifted beyond state instrumentalism 
and into the study of foreign legal and social institutions).  
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The transplant literature continues to grow to reflect the new actors 
involved in transplantation and the new modes of migration of laws. As the 
literature organically expands, it is time to take stock and build parameters 
around the term “legal transplant.” In the section below, I articulate an 
understanding of legal transplants that guides the research described in Part II 
and use this framework to determine that sex-selective abortion statutes in the 
United States qualify as transplants. 
B. Legal Transplants: A Category in Need of Clarity 
The phrase “legal transplants” appears in thousands of articles.42 However, 
authors imbue it with different meanings. To further confound the situation, 
the category has broadened over time to reflect the new ways in which laws 
migrate in the modern world. For example, whereas governments in the past 
were (often coercive) spreaders of law, 43  today, activists, lawyers, and 
transnational networks assist in the process of legal transplantation. Although 
authors have undertaken empirical and theoretical studies on transplants, much 
of the literature is in the form of case studies of transplants.44 
The intersection between the “diffusion of law” literature and the legal 
transplant literature is another area that lacks clear boundaries. The term 
“diffusion” brings to mind the way in which gas spreads. As such, the diffusion 
literature is not very concerned with the actors involved in the movement of 
laws or the source and destination of the law. 45  On the other hand, legal 
transplant scholars sometimes present law as an organ that is transplanted from 
one patient to another.46 Like the organ, the law must be the right fit for the 
recipient, and specialists may need to modify it so that it is successfully 
 
 42. Supra note 22 and accompanying text.  
 43. Twining describes the traditional legal transplant as follows: 
[A] bipolar relationship between two countries involving a direct one-way transfer of legal 
rules or institutions through the agency of governments involving formal enactment or 
adoption at a particular moment of time (a reception date) without major change. Although 
not explicitly stated in this example, it is commonly assumed that the standard case involves 
transfer from an advanced (parent) civil or common law system to a less developed one, in 
order to bring about technological change (‘to modernize’) by filling in gaps or replacing prior 
local law. There is also considerable vagueness about the criteria for ‘success’ of a reception—
one common assumption seems to be that if it has survived for a significant period ‘it works’. 
Twining, Diffusion of Law, supra note 33, at 15–16 (emphasis omitted). 
 44. Margit Cohn, Legal Transplant Chronicles: The Evolution of Unreasonableness and Proportionality 
Review of the Administration in the United Kingdom, 58 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 583, 588 (2010) (criticizing 
the proliferation of “countless case studies”).  
 45. See William Twining, Social Science and Diffusion of Law, 32 J.L. & SOC’Y 203, 237 (2005) 
[hereinafter Twining, Social Science] (“Legal scholarship [of diffusion of laws] has tended to neglect 
such ‘bottom-up’ perspectives.”).  
 46. Goldbach, Why Legal Transplants, supra note 5, at 584.  
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incorporated by the recipient. 47 Scholars often discuss legal transplants and 
diffusion of law interchangeably.48 However, the concept of diffusion is much 
broader.49 
Although there is no accepted set of characteristics of legal transplants,50 
authors have created typologies of them. Those typologies sort transplants into 
categories based, for example, on motivations of transplanters. 51  However, 
those typologies do not identify what is considered a legal transplant in the first 
place. 
Below, I articulate the features of modern legal transplants as they have 
been discussed in the literature. Some characteristics are universally agreed 
upon, but the category continues to expand as authors use the term to describe 
new methods and paths of migration. There are, however, limits to how far the 
term can be expanded without becoming meaningless. 
1.  Laws, Legal Institutions, and Legal Procedures Are the Subject of the 
Migration 
The transplant literature initially included only the movement of laws, 
legal institutions, and legal procedures.52 Broadening the category even further, 
authors have used the term legal transplants in association with the migration 
of policies between private entities.53 In addition, others have suggested that 
 
 47. See id. (citing Gunther Teubner, Legal Irritants: Good Faith in British Law or How Unifying Law 
Ends Up in New Divergences, 61 MOD. L. REV. 11, 12 (1998)).  
 48. See, e.g., CHRISTA RAUTENBACH, JAMES GALLEN & SUE FARREN, DIFFUSION OF LAWS: 
MOVEMENT OF LAWS AROUND THE WORLD 1 (Sue Farran, James Gallen, Jennifer Hendry & 
Christa Rautenbach eds., 2015) (“[D]iffusion of laws has been an important topic . . . at least since the 
publication of Alan Watson’s inspiring book Legal Transplants.”).  
 49. See Geremy Forman, A Tale of Two Regions: Diffusion of the Israeli “50 Percent Rule” from the 
Galilee to the Occupied West Bank, 34 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 671, 675 (2009) (“Overall, social science 
diffusion literature focuses on developing theories and models to explain when and why people adopt 
new inventions, ideas, and practices, and the spatial form assumed by their spread. Here, it is especially 
important to note that social science diffusion literature has said little about law.”). 
 50. David Nelken suggests that there is a need to consider new developments and identify 
unifying characteristics, plus also identify differences among transplants. David Nelken, Comparativists 
and Transferability, in COMPARATIVE LEGAL STUDIES: TRADITIONS AND TRANSITIONS 437, 459 
(Pierre Legrand & Roderick Munday eds., 2003).  
 51. See Miller, supra note 1, at 843 (“[I]t is now comparatively easy to use the literature to develop 
a typology of transplants based on the factors that motivate them.”); see also Cohn, supra note 44, at 
591–96 (identifying a number of typologies of legal transplants in the literature, including whether 
transplants are forced or voluntary on the part of the receiving countries, the level of success or failure 
of a transplant, the motivations of exporters or importers, and the identity of the exporter).  
 52. The early transplants were often entire civil or criminal codes exported from colonizers to the 
colonized that displaced existing codes or “filled gaps” where specific laws did not previously exist. The 
modern transplants are more likely to be discrete laws, rules, legal norms, procedures, or provisions in 
constitutions. Cohn, supra note 44, at 585 (stating that transplants today are not large-scale movements 
of law but rather concern a specific field of law). 
 53. See infra note 94 and accompanying text. 
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the use of foreign norms or rules in trials of indigenous people in Canada54 or 
immigrants in the United Kingdom55 are legal transplants. The diffusion of law 
literature includes within its ambit the migration of foreign precedent in case 
law,56 as well as the movement of symbols, rituals, and legal phenomena. For 
purposes of the literature review in Part II below, only migrations of law, legal 
institutions, or legal procedures are considered transplants. 
2.  The Migration Is Between Nation-States 
Likely because the study of legal transplants emerged in the comparative 
law literature, the term was initially used to describe migrations between 
nation-states. Many of the documented early transplants were indeed from 
colonial nations to colonized entities.57 Arguably, the migration of laws within 
different political units in one country could be considered a transplant. 
However, I limit my examination of the literature in Part II below to nation-
to-nation transplants. 
3.  There Are a Variety of Actors Involved in the Exporting/Importing 
Modern legal transplants have been driven by actors in both countries 
exporting the laws and countries where the law is received. In the exporting 
countries, foreign aid, donors who support law reform projects, or 
intergovernmental agencies might push for legal change in foreign countries.58 
Similarly, a host of actors can play a role in the process of importation in the 
receiving country. They include nongovernmental organizations, transnational 
networks of experts, and transnational civil society. 59  Legal norms are also 
spread and exchanged through a network of scholars. 60  People who were 
 
 54. See Toby S. Goldbach, Instrumentalizing the Expressive: Transplanting Sentencing Circles into the 
Canadian Criminal Trial, 25 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 61, 82 (2015) [hereinafter Goldbach, 
Instrumentalizing the Expressive]. 
 55. See Prakash Shah, Globalisation and the Challenge of Asian Legal Transplants in Europe, 2005 
SING. J. LEGAL STUD. 348, 348. 
 56. See, e.g., ANDREW NOVAK, Transnational Legal Citation as Method of Norm Diffusion, in 
TRANSNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION: CHALLENGING THE DEATH PENALTY AND 
CRIMINALIZATION OF HOMOSEXUALITY IN THE COMMONWEALTH 37, 37–61 (2020) (discussing 
the way foreign courts cite one another’s decisions as a method of norm diffusion). 
 57. Early literature primarily reveals the examination of nation-to-nation transfers. See, e.g., 
Watson, supra note 23, at 82–83 (examining the transfer of law between France, Germany, and Japan). 
 58. MATTEI & NADER, supra note 9, at 35–38. 
 59. See Slaughter, supra note 5, at 12, 19–26; see also Goldbach, Why Legal Transplants, supra note 
5, at 590 (pointing out that laws migrate as a result of transnational expert networks, international 
organizations, and private contracting parties); Mertus, supra note 5, at 1340 (focusing on the 
importance of transnational civil society in norm creation).  
 60. See Hans, supra note 24, at 473 (“My specific interest is to assess the role of collaborative 
working groups of scholars, including the Law and Society Association’s (LSA) inventions of 
Collaborative Research Networks (CRNs) and International Research Collaboratives (IRCs). I discuss 
how these groups allow us to compare, contrast, and study legal institutions and their international 
movements.”). 
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educated abroad, particularly in the United States, have also borrowed from 
U.S. law to reform legal institutions in their home countries.61 
4.  Transplants Have Multiple Origins 
When a country seeks to design a new law, it will likely look for models 
from multiple countries or jurisdictions.62 In addition, it is possible for one 
country to influence the laws of multiple countries. 63 There might also be 
intermediaries in the transplant process. Maximo Langer, for example, 
describes how Latin American experts pushed for criminal procedure norms and 
involved the United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”) 
in their work, and then those norms later migrated to other Latin American 
countries.64 
5.  Laws Often Transform When They Migrate  
To count as a legal transplant, the law or legal rule does not need to remain 
exactly the same when it migrates across borders. One scholar has famously 
argued that because laws are transformed when they migrate, legal transplants 
are impossible.65 A less extreme view would dictate that it is not that transplants 
are impossible, but that when a law moves from one context to another it 
changes significantly—perhaps so much so that it is no longer comparable to 
the law in its original setting. Furthermore, when a country adopts a law from 
another country, the law may have a different impact in the receiving country.66 
For example, U.S. civil and criminal procedures have been implemented 
disparately across a range of countries where they were transplanted (including 
Germany, Italy, Argentina, and France).67 As a normative matter, foreign laws 
 
 61. See Toby S. Goldbach, Benjamin Brake & Peter J. Katzenstein, The Movement of U.S. Criminal 
and Administrative Law: Processes of Transplanting and Translating, 20 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD., 141, 
163–67 (2013) (demonstrating how students from China who studied in the United States influenced 
China to adopt U.S.-style criminal procedures).  
 62. Margit Cohn demonstrates how concepts of proportionality and unreasonableness have 
evolved in the United Kingdom and traces their source to multiple jurisdictions. See Cohn, supra note 
44, at 607–08, 620–21 (“In this series of transplants, no single source was solely decisive, and different 
degrees of translation or distortion are apparent.”).  
 63. See Máximo Langer, From Legal Transplants to Legal Translations: The Globalization of Plea 
Bargaining and the Americanization Thesis in Criminal Procedure, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 1, 3 (2004) 
[hereinafter Langer, From Legal Transplants].  
 64. See Langer, Revolution, supra note 8, at 619.  
 65. See Pierre Legrand, The Impossibility of ‘Legal Transplants’, 4 MAASTRICHT J. EUR. & 
COMPAR. L. 111, 123–24 (1997); see also Julio Carvalho, Law, Language, and Knowledge: Legal Transplants 
from a Cultural Perspective, 20 GER. L.J. 21, 24 (2019) (arguing that the concept of legal transplants 
assumes that different legal cultures share the same epistemological accounts of what is meant by law). 
 66. Langer, From Legal Transplants, supra note 63, at 32–35 (proposing the metaphor of “legal 
translation” rather than “legal transplant” to capture how laws are integrated into a reception country).  
 67. Id. at 3.  
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should be adapted to local environments to better ensure successful 
implementation.68 
6.  Actors Doing the Exporting/Importing May Have Multiple Motives 
People borrow laws from other countries to save time, and sometimes 
foreign-trained lawyers adopt foreign laws from countries where they were 
trained to enhance their own practice.69 Laws are also externally dictated by 
foreign donors or governments.70 Further, exporters or importers might have 
other motives for referring to the law of another country. Colonial 
transplanters, for example, wanted to facilitate administration of their colonies 
through legal transplantation. 71  In the modern era, laws are sometimes 
transplanted with the goal of promoting a neoliberal vision of economic 
development and growth. Certain legal rules are advanced because they will 
decrease barriers to foreign investment and ownership in Global South 
countries. 72  Less economically developed countries borrow the laws from 
economically powerful countries as a way to gain legitimacy. 73  Some, for 
example, have pointed out that Singapore adopted the U.S. model for 
independent directors on boards of directors only as a way to enhance sources 
of foreign investment, since U.S.-style corporate law would have appealed to 
potential investors. 74  Thus, the legal transplant literature does not exclude 
categorizing something as a transplant just because there are multiple or hidden 
motives behind the importation of the law. 
7.  Multiple Sources of Evidence Can Be Used To Conclude That the 
Exporting/Importing Has Happened 
There are several ways to trace transplantations. Actors involved in the 
transplantation might make public statements about the use of foreign laws. 
The statements might appear in the media or be written in the legislation or 
policy itself. Another way to trace the transplantation is to examine the text of 
law to see if it resembles laws, procedures, or norms in other countries.75 
 
 
 68. Berkowitz et al., supra note 19, at 189–90.  
 69. Miller, supra note 1, at 845–46, 850–52.  
 70. Id. at 847–49.  
 71. MATTEI & NADER, supra note 9, at 26–28.  
 72. See id. at 22.  
 73. See John Henry Merryman, On the Convergence (and Divergence) of the Civil Law and the 
Common Law, 17 STAN. J. INT’L L. 357, 388 (1981); Miller, supra note 1, at 839–40.  
 74. Dan W. Puchniak & Luh Luh Lan, Independent Directors in Singapore: Puzzling Compliance 
Requiring Explanation, 65 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 265, 293 (2017). 
 75. In an empirical study, the author “looks for foreign influences in the legislative history as 
documented in official reports, treatises on the subject, or law journals” in statutes and also points to 
verbatim copying of statutes. Holger Spamann, Contemporary Legal Transplants: Legal Families and the 
Diffusion of (Corporate) Law, 2009 BYU L. REV. 1813, 1825.  
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Section I.B above articulates the general characteristics of modern legal 
transplants as used by legal transplant scholars. Using the traits of legal 
transplants identified above, I conducted a literature review, which I describe 
in the next part. 
II.  THE DEARTH OF REVERSE LEGAL TRANSPLANTS 
This Article focuses on an aspect of legal transplants that has not received 
much attention in the literature—transplants from the Global South to the 
Global North. Scholars have explained why there are legal transplants from the 
Global North to the Global South. Some have observed, for example, that law 
continues to be used by powerful nation-states and international institutions to 
plunder economically weaker nations. 76  Others have found that legal 
transplants occur to stimulate foreign investments by pursuing a veneer of 
legitimacy. 77  Still others have noted that Global South actors facilitate the 
transplant of laws from the Global North.78 The transplant literature, however, 
has not attempted to ascertain whether or not laws flow in the opposite 
direction. The paucity of attention on this subject is what this Article aims to 
rectify. 
During colonial times, transplants were unidirectional because they were 
used mainly by imperial nations to control their colonies.79 Today’s transplants, 
on the other hand, are not always the work of coercive government entities but 
involve individuals, lawyers, organizations, and other groups in both the origin 
and reception countries.80 As such, one would expect people to seek out laws in 
other countries that address similar concerns that they are attempting to address 
at home. People borrow to save time. A country that is less economically 
developed than another country may have designed innovative solutions to 
problems that are worth examining. 
In this part, I analyze the literature to determine the types of transplants 
scholars have documented. Section II.A explains the methodology used for the 
literature review, and Section II.B reports the findings of the review. 
A. Literature Review: Methodology 
I designed a study of the legal transplant literature to ascertain the 
directions of observed transplants. The goal of this review was to determine 
 
 76. See MATTEI & NADER, supra note 9, at 35–38. 
 77. See Miller, supra note 1, at 854–55.  
 78. See Langer, Revolution, supra note 8, at 618, 622.  
 79. See MATTEI & NADER, supra note 9, at 21–22. 
 80. See supra Section I.B.3. 
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which of the following pathways laws, legal procedures, and legal institutions 
have been observed to take: (1) from a Global North country to a Global South 
country (referred to as a “traditional legal transplant”), (2) from a Global North 
country to a Global North country or a Global South country to a Global South 
country (referred to as a “horizontal legal transplant”), or (3) from a Global 
South country to a Global North country (which I call a “reverse legal 
transplant”). “Vertical transplants,” which describe migrations from the 
international level to nation-states,81 are not included in this study.  
In conducting this research, I defined legal transplants using the 
characteristics developed in Part I above. Sticking closer to a more traditional 
definition of a transplant, I excluded any observations in the articles that 
involved (1) legal migrations other than between nation-states; and (2) 
movement of anything other than laws, institutions, or legal procedures (for 
example, migration of human rights policies between businesses would be 
excluded). 
In determining whether a country that is involved in a transplant is a 
“Global South” country or a “Global North” country in relation to the other, I 
used the gross domestic product per capita (“GDP per capita”) as reported in a 
UN database as a proxy for the country’s level of economic development.82 
Specifically, I used the GDP per capita of the country in the year that the 
transplant was documented. 
I limited the search to articles published from January 1, 1980, to January 
1, 2020, in the JSTOR database83 that contained the phrase “legal transplants.” 
This search resulted in 614 articles and the results appeared in the order of 
relevance. Working with a research assistant, I reviewed all 614 of those articles 
in the order they appeared. 
 
 81. Anna Dolidze, Bridging Comparative and International Law: Amicus Curiae Participation as a 
Vertical Legal Transplant, 26 EUR. J. INT’L L. 851, 853 (2015). 
 82. Per Capita GDP at Current Prices – US Dollars, UNDATA (Feb. 10, 2020), 
http://data.un.org/Data.aspx?q=GDP+per+capita&d=SNAAMA&f=grID%3a101%3bcurrID%3aUSD
%3bpcFlag%3a1 [https://perma.cc/D5YC-5563]. There are other measures for development. For 
example, the human development index ranks countries not only on economic growth but also on 
literacy, health, and other indicators. Human Development Index (HDI), UNITED NATIONS DEV. 
PROGRAMME: HUM. DEV. REPS., http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/human-development-index-hdi 
[https://perma.cc/2V4H-AFSB]. Political scientists have developed their own methodologies for 
measuring the relative political power of nations in the world. See, e.g., Michael Beckley, The Power of 
Nations: Measuring What Matters, 43 INT’L SEC. 7, 9 (2018) (developing a “net indicator” framework 
that “does a better job . . . at tracking the rise and fall of great powers, . . . predicting war and dispute 
outcomes, and serving as a control variable in statistical models of various aspects of international 
relations”). While some combination of political power and economic power likely impact the direction 
of legal transplants, in this Article I use a pure economic measure for simplicity’s sake—GDP per 
capita—to determine whether a country is more economically powerful than another country. 
 83. Search conducted on September 5, 2020. I chose JSTOR over Westlaw or LexisNexis because 
it contains a wider array of sources both beyond the United States and outside of the legal discipline. 
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I excluded certain articles and transplants from the literature review. 
Namely, I intentionally excluded the following types of transplants and articles 
from the study: (1) transplants that relate to the movement of laws from 
imperial nations to their colonies (because this Article aims to understand 
movements in the modern era); (2) articles that discussed legal transplants 
generally but did not provide any examples of them; (3) transplants from any 
origin and destination other than nation-states (for example, transplants 
between private entities were excluded); and (4) transplants involving anything 
other than laws, legal procedures, or institutions. Thus, only seventy articles 
had examples of transplants. In some of the articles that I did use, on the other 
hand, I found more than one observation of a transplant. 
Laws that migrated from a country with a higher GDP per capita to a 
lower GDP per capita were defined as traditional legal transplants. Laws that 
migrated from a country with a lower GDP per capita to a country with a higher 
GDP per capita were considered reverse legal transplants. Legal movements 
between countries with relatively the same GDP per capita were considered to 
be “horizontal legal transplants.”84 This study intentionally defined horizontal 
legal transplants narrowly in order to capture as many reverse legal transplants 
as possible. 
A transplant was identified as a horizontal transplant using the following 
methodology. First, we determined the amount equal to thirty percent of the 
GDP per capita of the country with the higher GDP per capita (the “Range”). 
Second, we subtracted the GDP per capita of the country with the lower GDP 
per capita from the GDP per capita of the country with the higher GDP per 
capita (the “Difference”). Third, the transplant was considered a horizontal 
legal transplant only if the Range was greater than the Difference. Otherwise, 
it was categorized as a reverse legal transplant or traditional legal transplant. 
I present an example to demonstrate that the formula for determining a 
horizontal legal transplant is relatively conservative. For example, under this 
formula, even a transplant from Spain to Germany in 2018 would be considered 
a reverse legal transplant. Germany’s GDP per capita in 2018 was $47,514 and 
Spain’s was $30,406. 85 Arguably, the GDP per capita of the two countries and 
their status as nations that are part of the European Union might suggest that 
any legal movement between them should be considered a horizontal legal 
transplant. 
Creating a narrow range for what qualified as a horizontal legal transplant 
increased the number of observations that were considered reverse legal 
 
 84. When I refer to horizontal legal transplants, I focus on the economic power of the nations 
involved in the transplantation. The term has also been used to refer to the collaboration between law 
deans and law professors in the United States and China. Matthew S. Erie, Legal Education Reform in 
China through U.S.-Inspired Legal Transplants, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 60, 86–87 (2009). 
 85. Per Capita GDP at Current Prices – US Dollars, supra note 82. 
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transplants (as well as traditional legal transplants). One hypothesis of this 
Article is that scholars have not written significantly about reverse legal 
transplants. By creating a broader category for what qualified as a reverse legal 
transplant, I averted objections that the methodology unduly tilted the equation 
in favor of proving my hypothesis. 
It might seem that the methodology has some limitations. First, the search 
of a database of articles excludes a wealth of transplants documented in 
academic books.86 Second, even within a database of articles, by using the search 
term “legal transplants,” the literature review would not capture articles that do 
not use that term but do discuss the migration of laws, institutions, and 
procedures across borders.87 
While this is a valid critique, there is no reason to believe that certain types 
of transplants were disproportionately excluded over others. The total number 
of observations might have been greater if the study included books and articles 
that discuss migrations of law without using the phrase “legal transplants.” 
However, the proportion of the observations of transplants in relation to each 
other (for example, traditional legal transplants, horizontal legal transplants, 
and reverse legal transplants) might not have been very different than reported 
in Table 1 below even if more observations of transplants were included in the 
study. 
B. Literature Review: Findings 
Table 1: Direction of Movement of Transplants 
 




Global North to Global South 199 
Horizontal Legal 
Transplant 
Global North to Global North 





Global South to Global North 5 
 
 
 86. See, e.g., MITCHEL DE S.-O.-L’E. LASSER, JUDICIAL TRANSFORMATIONS: THE RIGHTS 
REVOLUTION IN THE COURTS OF EUROPE 206–07 (2009) (discussing how fundamental rights have 
spread across European courts).  
 87. See, e.g., Nuno Garoupa & Tom Ginsburg, Guarding the Guardians: Judicial Councils and Judicial 
Independence, 57 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 103, 105 (2009) (observing that judicial councils for the 
appointment of judges have spread across the world but never using the term “legal transplants”).  
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The findings of this review of articles on legal transplants demonstrates 
that the great majority of transplants (namely one hundred and ninety-nine) 
observed in the literature are traditional legal transplants—for example, 
transplants from Global North countries to Global South countries. Twenty-
four horizontal legal transplants have also been observed, which are transplants 
between countries of relatively similar GDPs per capita.88 Many transplants 
considered traditional legal transplants might also be appropriately considered 
horizontal legal transplants, but the category of horizontal legal transplants was 
designed to be very narrow for the reasons discussed above. 
In only five cases did the literature document legal borrowings by a 
country with a higher GDP per capita from a country with a lower GPD per 
capita. In particular, Turkey borrowed laws from India,89 Swaziland used legal 
norms from Uganda,90 Japan borrowed from Germany,91 South Africa from 
India,92 and Bhutan used laws from India.93 
The disparity between the GDP per capita between countries where 
reverse legal transplants have been observed is not very stark because (as 
discussed above) what qualifies as a horizontal legal transplant was narrowly 
tailored. As mentioned above, I used a relatively conservative range to 
determine whether or not a transplant was horizontal so that we could identify 
as many reverse legal transplants as possible. 
Although this study can only definitively comment on what types of 
transplants are written about in the legal transplant literature, the results likely 
also reflect the directionality of transplants in practice. In other words, there 
are few reverse legal transplants in practice. As noted above, it is not likely that 
 
 88. Legal migrations between regional institutions could also be considered a type of horizontal 
legal transplant. It is interesting to note that in the literature review, in all the examples of migration 
of laws between regional institutions, the sending institution was located in the Global North and the 
receiving institution in the Global South. See, e.g., Karen J. Alter, Laurence R. Helfer & Osvaldo 
Saldías, Transplanting the European Court of Justice: The Experience of the Andean Tribunal of Justice, 60 
AM. J. COMPAR. L. 629, 632 n.14 (2012) (finding that the European Court of Justice inspired the 
creation of a number of similar bodies around the world and eight of those bodies were in Global South 
countries and the other two were in countries located in the Global North).  
 89. See Twining, Social Science, supra note 45, at 224 (“In preparation of [the Turkish] 
Constitution, wide use was made of the West German and Italian models, the provisions on economic 
development being insured by the Indian model of 1949.”). 
 90. Doron Shulztiner & Guy E. Carmi, Human Dignity in National Constitutions: Functions, 
Promises and Dangers, 62 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 461, 479 (2014).  
 91. Katharina Pistor, Yoram Keinan, Jan Kleinheisterkamp & Mark D. West, Evolution of 
Corporate Law and the Transplant Effect: Lessons from Six Countries, 18 WORLD BANK RSCH. OBSERVER 
89, 101 (2003).  
 92. Yaniv Roznai, Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments—The Migration and Success of a 
Constitutional Idea, 61 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 657, 705 (2013).  
 93. Alessandro Simoni & Richard Whitecross, Gross National Happiness and the Heavenly Stream 
of Justice: Modernization and Dispute Resolution in the Kingdom of Bhutan, 55 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 165, 174 
(2007).  
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this literature review of articles using the phrase “legal transplants” would 
disproportionately exclude one type of transplant over another. Thus, even if 
books and articles that describe legal transplants without using that term were 
included, it would not likely change the proportion as between the three 
categories of transplants discussed here. 
Reverse migrations of norms (rather than laws) outside of the context of 
transfers between nation-states are worth noting. Multinational companies 
spread human rights as well as other norms around the world by forcing vendors 
in their supply chain to adopt certain policies.94 Such transplants also mark a 
one-way stream from corporations based in the Global North to vendors and 
suppliers in the Global South.95 
Other reverse migrations involve judges who utilize certain norms for 
specific cases. First, Toby Goldbach observes that some Canadian judges use 
traditional indigenous methods, such as sentencing circles, when sentencing 
indigenous peoples.96 Second, Prakash Shah has proposed that judges in the 
United Kingdom use certain norms (such as Sharia law) when adjudicating cases 
involving immigrants.97 In both of those cases, legal rules are not being adopted 
to inform general policy or govern the mainstream group but only to resolve 
how to treat minority communities in specific trials. While sex-selective 
abortion statutes, the reverse legal transplant discussed in Part III, were adopted 
to purportedly address the behavior of Asian immigration, they apply more 
broadly to every pregnant person in the United States. 
In sum, the transplant literature largely documents the migration of laws, 
legal institutions, and legal procedures from Global North to Global South 
countries. A modest number of transplants between nation-states with 
relatively similar levels of growth have also been observed. However, very few 
transplants from countries with lower levels of economic growth to countries 
 
 94. See Li-Wen Lin, Legal Transplants Through Private Contracting: Codes of Vendor Conduct in 
Global Supply Chains as an Example, 57 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 711, 741 (2009) (arguing that private 
contracts with vendors in China have resulted in “bottom-up” legal transplants with eventual impact 
on nationwide policy shifts); see also Fabrizio Cafaggi, New Foundations of Transnational Private 
Regulation, 38 J.L. & SOC’Y 20, 43–45 (2011) (discussing the rulemaking and regulation-making power 
of private industry); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 
129, 147, 156–61 (2013) (describing the expansion of the private governance of environmental law 
through bilateral agreements created for supply chains, mergers and acquisitions, and commercial loans, 
and noting that “bilateral standard-setting need not be motivated by altruism to be characterized as 
private environmental governance so long as it induces a private entity to achieve a traditionally 
governmental objective”). 
 95. See Lin, supra note 94, at 741.  
 96. See Goldbach, Instrumentalizing the Expressive, supra note 54, at 64–66.  
 97. See Shah, supra note 55, at 356–58. Although they have not used the lens of legal transplants, 
other authors have also discussed the migration of evidence of foreign cultures or customs in trials of 
immigrants. See Doriane Lambelet Coleman, Individualizing Justice Through Multiculturalism: The 
Liberals’ Dilemma, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1093, 1093–94 (1996); Leti Volpp, (Mis)Identifying Culture: 
Asian Women and the Cultural Defense, 17 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 57, 57–58 (1994). 
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with higher levels of growth appear in the articles studied. In the next part, I 
present a case study of a reverse legal transplant. 
III.  A REVERSE LEGAL TRANSPLANT: SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION 
STATUTES 
Laws that are aimed at preventing a person from aborting a fetus on the 
basis of its predicted sex have been proliferating in the United States in the last 
several years, as described in Section III.A. The initial bills referred to India’s 
prohibitions on sex determination. Using the traits of legal transplants 
elaborated in Part I, I explain why the U.S. state statutes are reverse legal 
transplants in Section III.B below. 
A. The Proliferation of Sex-Selective Abortion Statutes 
Since 2009, nearly half of all state legislatures have considered bills to 
prohibit sex-selective abortion. 98  Today, laws prohibiting women from 
terminating their pregnancies because of the sex of the fetus are effective in 
nine states.99 These statutes forbid a medical professional from performing an 
abortion if they know that the patient’s motive for the abortion is the predicted 
biological sex of the fetus.100 
The majority of the U.S. House of Representatives voted in favor of a 
similar ban in 2012.101 That same year, anti-sex-selective abortion legislation 
 
 98. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
 99. The nine states that prohibit women from terminating their pregnancies because of the sex of 
a fetus are Arizona, Arkansas, Kansas, Mississippi, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, 
Pennsylvania, and South Dakota. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02(A)(1) (Westlaw through 
the 2d Reg. Sess. of the 54th Leg.); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1904(a) (LEXIS through all legislation 
of the 2020 1st Extraordinary Sess. and the 2020 Fiscal Sess.); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6726(a) 
(Westlaw through laws enacted during the 2020 Reg. and Spec. Sesss. of the Kansas Leg. effective on 
or before July 1, 2020); Life Equality Act of 2020, § 2(2), 2020 Miss. Laws Adv. Sh. H.B. 1295 (LEXIS 
through 2020 Legis. Sess.) (to be codified); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.121(a) (LEXIS through 
Sess. Laws 2020-94 of the 2020 Reg. Sess.); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-04.1(1)(a) (LEXIS 
through all acts approved by the governor through the end of the 2019 Reg. Leg. Sess.); OKLA. STAT. 
ANN. tit. 63, § 1-731.2(B) (Westlaw through enacted legislation of the 2d Reg. Sess. of the 57th Leg.); 
18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3204(c) (Westlaw through 2020 Reg. Sess. Act 78); S.D. 
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-64 (Westlaw through 2020 Sess. Laws, Exec. Order 20-31 and Supreme 
Court Rule 20-06). Illinois adopted a ban in 1975 but repealed the law in 2019. See Illinois Abortion 
Law of 1975, Pub. Act No. 79-1126, 1975 Ill. Laws 3462, repealed by Reproductive Health Act, Pub. Act 
No. 101-0013 (codified at 755 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 55/1-1 to 55/999-999 (Westlaw through Pub. 
Act 101-651)).  
 100. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02(A)(1) (Westlaw); ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-
1904(a) (LEXIS); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6726(a) (Westlaw); Life Equality Act of 2020, § 2(2); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 90-21.121(a) (LEXIS); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.1-04.1(2) (LEXIS); 
OKLA. STAT. Ann. tit. 63, § 1-731.2(C)–(D) (Westlaw); 18 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. 
§ 3204(d) (Westlaw); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-64 (Westlaw). 
 101. See Ed O’Keefe, Bill Banning ‘Sex-Selective Abortions’ Fails in the House, WASH. POST (May 31, 
2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/2chambers/post/bill-banning-sex-selective-abortions-
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was the second most proposed anti-abortion legislation in the United States.102 
A case involving the constitutionality of sex-selective abortion bans has even 
reached the U.S. Supreme Court.103 Although the Court refused to review the 
Seventh Circuit’s finding that the statute in question was unconstitutional, the 
Court, in an unusual move, gave a reason for why it denied certiorari.104 The 
Court indicated that it wanted to give more appeals courts the opportunity to 
review similar statutes.105 In his concurring opinion, Justice Thomas made it 
clear that he did not agree with the lower court’s opinion.106 
A doctor who performs an abortion and has knowledge that a woman is 
seeking an abortion due to the sex of the fetus faces criminal liability in many 
states that ban sex-selective abortion. 107 But if an abortion seeker does not 
volunteer her motive, how will a medical professional determine if sex plays a 
role? To get at this issue, some states require medical professionals to inquire 
about the reasons why a woman is seeking to terminate her pregnancy. For 
example, South Dakota’s law banning sex-selective abortion requires medical 
professionals to “[i]nquire into whether the pregnant mother knows the sex of 
her unborn child and, if so, whether the mother is seeking an abortion due to 
the sex of the unborn child.” 108 Oklahoma requires medical professionals to 
complete a form for each abortion they perform, which includes a section on 
the reasons the woman obtained the abortion.109 In Arizona, while the law does 
not directly require any kind of inquiry, each medical professional must sign an 
affidavit certifying that he or she “is not aborting the child because of the child’s 
sex or race and has no knowledge that the child to be aborted is being aborted 
because of the child’s sex or race.” 110  Arizona also requires health care 
 
fails-in-the-house/2012/05/31/gJQAgCYn4U_blog.html [https://perma.cc/NDN4-88MV (dark 
archive)]. 
 102. See Lydia O’Connor, San Francisco May Be First City To Oppose Sex-Selective Abortion 
Bans,   HUFFPOST, https://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/09/10/san-francisco-sex-selective-abortion 
_n_5800840.html [https://perma.cc/79UU-2KG4] (Sept. 17, 2014). 
 103. Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1780 (2019). 
 104. Id. at 1782. 
 105. Id. (“Only the Seventh Circuit has thus far addressed this kind of law. We follow our ordinary 
practice of denying petitions insofar as they raise legal issues that have not been considered by 
additional Courts of Appeals.”). 
 106. Id. at 1792 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“The Court’s decision to allow further percolation should 
not be interpreted as agreement with the decisions below.”).  
 107. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.02(A)(1) (Westlaw through the 2d Reg. Sess. of 
the 54th Leg.) (mandating that a person who “[p]erforms an abortion knowing that the abortion is 
sought based on the sex or race of the child” is guilty of a felony). 
 108. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-56(4A) (Westlaw through 2020 Sess. Laws, Exec. Order 20-
31 and Supreme Court Rule 20-06). 
 109. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 1-738k (Westlaw current with legislation effective through 
September 1, 2020 of the Second Regular Session of the 57th Legislature (2020)).  
 110. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-2157 (Westlaw).  
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professionals to report “known violations .  .  .  to appropriate law enforcement 
authorities.”111 
Arkansas goes further than any other state. It requires medical 
professionals to ask each patient if she knows the predicted future sex of the 
fetus. If the patient answers in the affirmative, then the professional must spend 
“time and effort” seeking out the patient’s entire pregnancy-related history 
(including prior pregnancies).112 This means that any woman who is aware of 
the predicted biological sex of the fetus may suffer delays in receiving 
reproductive care as she waits for physicians to seek out her pregnancy history. 
Sex-selective abortion bans may lead doctors to deny care even to women who 
are not engaging in the practice of sex-selective abortion and also subjects all 
women to invasive and humiliating questions about their motives for seeking 
an abortion. In the following section, this Article explains why sex-selective 
abortion bills are reverse legal transplants. 
B. Sex-Selective Abortion Statutes as Reverse Legal Transplants 
One of the reasons sex-selective abortion laws are being proposed in the 
United States is because it is perceived that immigrants from countries like 
India are terminating pregnancies when they learn that the fetus is female.113 
As discussed below, sex-selective abortion statutes satisfy the characteristics of 
transplants that were developed in Section I.B. 
1.  What Is Being Imported/Exported? 
A piece of legislation from one nation, namely India,114 is being used to 
influence law in another country, the United States. Legislative representatives 
and pro-life advocates in the United States are referencing a discrete portion of 
India’s laws on abortion. Abortion is legal in India through legislation.115  
2.  What Is the Origin and Destination of the Law? 
As noted above, laws adopted to curb sex selection in India are being 
advanced in the United States as appropriate responses to sex-selective abortion 
in this country. However, this migration of laws moves in the opposite direction 
from a traditional legal transplant. India’s GDP per capita of $2,055 is 
significantly lower than the GDP per capita of the United States, which is 
 
 111. Id. § 13-3603.02(D). 
 112. ARK. CODE ANN. § 20-16-1904(a)–(b) (LEXIS through all legislation of the 2020 1st 
Extraordinary Sess. and the 2020 Fiscal Sess.). 
 113. See infra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 114. The Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994 
(India); The Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Amendment 
Act, 2002 (India). 
 115. The Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, 1971, § 3(1)–(2) (India).  
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$62,918.116 Thus, the law migrates from a Global South country to a Global 
North country. 
3.  Who Is Doing the Importing/Exporting? 
Modern legal transplants are the work of a wide range of actors and are 
not limited to governments. 117  Anti-abortion groups and legislators are 
responsible for importing the abortion restrictions into the United States. As 
we would expect with laws that flow from Global South countries, there are no 
actors or groups in India that are attempting to push the United States to adopt 
the bans. 
4.  Does the Law Have Multiple Origins? 
The sex-selective abortion bills in the United States have referred to the 
laws of both India and China. Arguably, then, the sex-selective abortion statutes 
are laws that have multiple origins. Future researchers should conduct a 
comparative analysis of China’s laws and context. That discussion is outside of 
the scope of this Article. 
5.  Does the Law Transform When It Migrates? 
Modern laws that migrate to another country are often modified—text 
might be removed, added, or changed in certain sections. 118  Sex-selective 
abortion laws are no different. The laws that are being proposed in the United 
States restrict abortion, but the regulations in India only prevent physicians 
from revealing to the parents the predicted sex of the fetus.119 The rationale for 
India’s law is that, if parents do not know the predicted sex of the fetus, they 
will not be able to terminate pregnancies of female fetuses simply because of 
their sex.120 
6.  Do Actors Doing the Exporting/Importing Have Multiple Motives? 
Advocates for sex-selective abortion prohibitions in the United States are 
not pushing for the laws only because India has them—their use in India is just 
one justification.121 Notwithstanding this, it is still appropriate to view those 
 
 116. Per Capita GDP at Current Prices – US Dollars, supra note 82. 
 117. Supra Section I.B.3 and accompanying text. 
 118. See supra Section I.B.5 and accompanying text.  
 119. The Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Amendment 
Act, 2002, ch. III, § 5(1) (India).  
 120. See KIRTI SINGH, LAWS AND SON PREFERENCE IN INDIA: A REALITY 
CHECK    58    (2013),   https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/jahia-news/documents/publications/ 
2013/LawsandSonPreferenceinIndia.pdf [https://perma.cc/HV5C-GHMN]. 
 121. See, e.g., Mary Ziegler, Women’s Rights on the Right: The History and Stakes of Modern Pro-Life 
Feminism, 28 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 232, 267 (2013) (“As the sex-selection . . . campaign[] 
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laws as reverse legal transplants even if there are other motives at play in 
advancing the laws, including the goal of pro-life groups to chip away at 
reproductive rights. As discussed above, there are a host of motives involved 
when governments, institutions, and people borrow laws from other nations or 
push for legal change in other countries. 
7.  What Evidence Demonstrates That Exporting/Importing Has Happened? 
There are several ways to trace transplantations. In this Article, I 
undertake a discursive analysis122 of the text of the bills and their proponents’ 
statements. For example, one version of the Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act 
(“PRENDA”)123 introduced in the U.S. House of Representatives states: 
Countries with longstanding experience with sex-selection abortion—
such as the Republic of India, the United Kingdom, and the People’s 
Republic of China—have enacted restrictions on sex selection and have 
steadily continued to strengthen prohibitions and penalties. The United States, 
by contrast, has no law in place to restrict sex-selection abortion, 
establishing the United States as affording less protection from sex-based feticide 
than the Republic of India or the People’s Republic of China, whose recent 
practices of sex-selection abortion were vehemently and repeatedly 
condemned by United States congressional resolution and by the United 
States Ambassador to the Commission on the Status of Women.124 
Thus, PRENDA points to those laws of India and China that are aimed at 
prohibiting sex-selective abortions of fetuses predicted to be girls.125 The bill 
also suggests that the United States lagged behind India and China, who have 
done more to protect women in this regard.126 
That same bill further asserts that Asian Americans practice sex-selective 
abortions in the United States in the same way that people in Asia do: 
Evidence strongly suggests that some Americans are exercising sex-
selection abortion practices within the United States consistent with 
 
illustrate[s], pro-lifers have tried to appropriate claims about sex discrimination, and use them to deny 
women reproductive choice.”). 
 122. Annelise Riles posits three types of comparative law methods—categories, discursive, and 
contextual. See Annelise Riles, Wigmore’s Treasure Box: Comparative Law in the Era of Information, 40 
HARV. INT’L. L.J. 221, 231–50 (1999).  
 123. PRENDA has been introduced in the U.S. Congress every term since 2011. See Prenatal 
Nondiscrimination Act of 2019, H.R. 2373, 116th Cong. (2019); Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of 
2017, H.R. 147, 115th Cong. (2017); Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of 2016, H.R. 4924, 114th Cong. 
(2016); Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of 2015, S. 48, 114th Cong. (2015); Prenatal Nondiscrimination 
Act of 2013, S. 138, 113th Cong. (2013); Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of 2012, H.R. 3541, 112th 
Cong. (2011). 
 124. H.R. 4924 § 2(a)(1)(J) (emphasis added). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. 
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discriminatory practices common to their country of origin, or the 
country to which they trace their ancestry.127 
The political rhetoric of politicians in state legislatures that support these 
bills also refer to Asian immigration as a justification for the bans. For example, 
Don Hagger, a state representative in South Dakota, stated: 
Let me tell you, our population in South Dakota is a lot more diverse 
than it ever was . . . . There are cultures that look at a sex-selection 
abortion as being culturally okay. And I will suggest to you that we are 
embracing individuals from some of those cultures in this country, or in 
this state. And I think that’s a good thing that we invite them to come, 
but I think it’s also important that we send a message that this is a state 
that values life, regardless of its sex.128 
Finally, another version of PRENDA in the House of Representatives 
refers to the problem of “missing women”129 around the world to justify a U.S. 
ban.130 
Interestingly, the use of foreign references in the context of sex-selective 
abortion laws has even seeped into Supreme Court jurisprudence. The U.S. 
Supreme Court’s order denying certification on the constitutionality of 
Indiana’s anti-sex-selection statute refers to the practices in India to justify the 
importance of the issue.131 Justice Thomas notes that “[i]n Asia, widespread sex-
selective abortions have led to as many as 160 million ‘missing’ women—more 
 
 127. Id. § 2(a)(1)(F) (emphasis added). The most recent federal bill that has been proposed has 
removed references to other countries, likely as a result of advocacy by the National Asian and Pacific 
American Women’s Forum (“NAPAWF”) and other organizations. See H.R. 2373 § 2(a)(2). 
 128. Molly Redden, GOP Lawmaker: We Need To Ban Sex-Selective Abortions Because of Asian 
Immigrants, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 25, 2014), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2014/02/south-
dakota-stace-nelson-ban-sex-based-abortions-because-asian-immigrants/ [https://perma.cc/B8XG-
4ZYT]. 
 129. Amartya Sen drew attention to the maltreatment of women by coining the phrase “missing 
women.” Amartya Sen, More Than 100 Million Women Are Missing, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 
20,  1990,  https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1990/12/20/more-than-100-million-women-are-missing/ 
[https://perma.cc/K43S-T9G5]. In 1990, Sen postulated that more than 100 million women were 
missing in the world because of the disparate treatment of girls and other social inequalities. Id. Sen’s 
work created a genre of studies that use sex ratios to calculate the number of missing women. Debraj 
Ray, Where Are All the Women?, WORLD ECON. F. (Oct. 19, 2015), https://www.weforum.org/agenda/ 
2015/10/where-are-all-the-women/ [https://perma.cc/5Z8L-W5AN]. Economists have debated the 
appropriate formula for calculating the number of missing women. See Stephan Klasen & Claudia 
Wink, “Missing Women”: Revisiting the Debate, 9 FEMINIST ECON. 263, 263 (2003). Despite Sen’s best 
intentions, the concept of missing women has evolved from one that captures multiple forms of 
women’s inequality to one that only measures the number of female fetuses that have been aborted. See 
Jason Abrevaya, Are There Missing Girls in the United States? Evidence from Birth Data, 1 AM. ECON. J.: 
APPLIED ECON. 1, 23 (2009). 
 130. Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of 2012, H.R. 3541 § 2(I), 112th Cong. (2011). 
 131. Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana & Kentucky, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1791 (2019) 
(Thomas, J., concurring). 
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than the entire female population of the United States.”132 By citing my work 
on India (and not on the United States), Justice Thomas reinforces the 
argument that anti-sex-selective laws in the United States are being influenced 
by practices in other countries.133 Only after referring to Asia does he move to 
the United States to incorrectly134 argue that “sex-selective abortions of girls are 
common among certain populations in the United States as well.”135 
In sum, bills and laws to prohibit sex-selective abortion in the United 
States are proliferating around the country and can be characterized as reverse 
legal transplants. In the next part, I explain why people who would normally be 
opposed to restrictions on abortion found it hard to resist these reverse legal 
transplants, at least initially. 
IV.  BEYOND UNIVERSALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACHES 
India enacted restrictions on sex-selective abortion to enhance gender 
equality. Particularly when they were first introduced, pro-choice legislators 
and other pro-choice people were conflicted about the laws. Surprisingly, many 
supported them even though the prohibitions seem more like targeted 
restrictions on abortion providers, also known as TRAP laws,136 than laws that 
will promote gender equality. I argue in Section IV.B that the inability of pro-
choice people to approach sex-selective abortion prohibitions with the same 
clarity as other abortion restrictions proposed by pro-life groups relates, in part, 
to the human rights framework that guides the work of many pro-choice 
organizations, individuals and, representatives. 
A. Pro-Choice Support for Sex-Selective Abortion Laws 
Indian feminist organizations pushed for restrictions on sex-determination 
in India.137 In the United States, pro-life groups frame the restrictions as pro-
women’s rights laws.138 This section raises a few puzzling questions: Why did 
 
 132. Id. (citing Sital Kalantry, How To Fix India’s Sex-Selection Problem, N.Y. TIMES, INT’L ED., 
July 28, 2017, at 9). 
 133. See Sital Kalantry, By Misciting My Work, Justice Thomas Proves My Point, U. PENN. PRESS 
(June 12, 2019), https://pennpress.typepad.com/pennpresslog/2019/06/by-misciting-my-work-justice-
thomas-proves-my-point.html [https://perma.cc/36UQ-NK5V]. 
 134. SITAL KALANTRY, WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS AND MIGRATION: SEX-SELECTIVE 
ABORTION LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES AND INDIA 112 (2017) [hereinafter KALANTRY, WOMEN’S 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND MIGRATION]. 
 135. Box, 139 S. Ct. at 1791 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
 136. TRAP laws place unneeded requirements on abortion providers—such as requiring them to 
have admitting privileges in local hospitals—in order to make the burdens of operating clinics so great 
that they will eventually need to shut down. See What Are TRAP Laws?, PLANNED PARENTHOOD, 
https://www.plannedparenthoodaction.org/issues/abortion/trap-laws [https://perma.cc/U7KA-6BSY].  
 137. See infra notes 143–47 and accompanying text.  
 138. Seema Mohapatra, False Framings: The Co-Opting of Sex-Selection by the Anti-Abortion 
Movement, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 270, 270–73 (2015).  
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many pro-choice legislators support prohibitions on sex-selective abortion, and 
why are mainstream pro-choice groups not vigorously advocating against them? 
I suggest answers to these questions in Section IV.B below. 
1.  Feminist Organizations Lobby for Restrictions on Sex Determination in 
India 
As a result of feminist activism, no pregnant woman in India can legally 
find out whether her child will be a boy or a girl. This was India’s legal response 
to a growing crisis in which parents would discover the sex of the fetus using 
ultrasounds139 and abort the fetus if it were predicted to be a girl. 
By the mid-1980s, many clinics in the capital city of New Delhi offered 
prenatal ultrasound exams.140 With a growing middle class and increased access 
to ultrasound machines, more abortions occurred, and the ratio of men to 
women in the country started to become skewed toward males.141 As a result of 
the factors discussed below, by some estimates, today there are 300,000 to 
500,000 sex-selective abortions per year and 50 million missing women.142 
Witnessing sexist advertisements 143  by ultrasound providers and the 
widespread use of this technology to detect sex and abort female fetuses, Indian 
feminist organizations pushed to restrict sex selection. In 1982, a group of 
women’s organizations planned a protest meeting to demand a complete ban on 
sex determination tests.144 In Mumbai, a group called the Forum Against Sex 
Determination and Sex Pre-Selection was created in 1985.145 These groups did 
not want to place restrictions on abortion access, but instead demanded that 
 
 139. In an ultrasound test, a medical professional uses a machine that can observe the anatomy of 
the fetus and detect its sex at around eighteen weeks of gestation. Medical professionals are not always 
able to identify the body parts accurately, particularly if the fetus is not in an appropriate physical 
position to allow for such a determination. See Ceara O’Brien, Social Implications of Non-Invasive Blood 
Tests To Determine the Sex of Fetuses, EMBRYO PROJECT ENCYCLOPEDIA (Mar. 24, 2014), 
http://embryo.asu.edu/handle/10776/7648 [https://perma.cc/3KTD-PU82]. 
 140. MARA HVISTENDAHL, UNNATURAL SELECTION: CHOOSING BOYS OVER GIRLS, AND 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF A WORLD FULL OF MEN 49 (2011). 
 141. See CHRISTOPHE Z. GUILMOTO, CHARACTERISTICS OF SEX-RATIO IMBALANCE IN 
INDIA, AND FUTURE SCENARIOS 4–6, 20 (2007), http://www.unfpa.org/gender/docs/studies/ 
india.pdf [https://perma.cc/L45K-MNTW]. 
 142. Sunny Hundal, India’s 60 Million Women That Never Were, AL JAZEERA (Aug. 8, 2013), 
https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/07/201372814110570679.html 
[https://perma.cc/9GPS-UZ3F].  
 143. Referring to dowry, advertisements would say, “[p]ay 500 rupees now and save 
50,000 later.” Missing Sisters, ECONOMIST (Apr. 17, 2003), http://www.economist.com/node/1715401 
[https://perma.cc/YYX4-EDUZ (dark archive)]. 
 144. See MARY JOHN, SEX RATIOS AND GENDER BIASED SEX SELECTION: HISTORY, DEBATES 
AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS 8 (2014), https://asiapacific.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/pub-pdf/Sex-
Ratios-and-Gender-Biased-Sex-Selection.pdf [https://perma.cc/78NY-5YLU]. 
 145. Id. 
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medical professionals be prohibited from telling patients the sex of a fetus.146 
The state government of Maharashtra, where Mumbai is located, passed 
legislation to ban sex determination tests in 1988 before any national legislation 
was adopted.147 
Six years later in 1994, the Government of India enacted the Pre-Natal 
Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act 
(“PNDT”).148 This Act, which went into effect in 1996, prohibited the use of 
techniques (such as ultrasounds and amniocentesis) to determine the sex of the 
fetus after conception.149 The law only addressed postconception methods of 
sex selection, but with technology rapidly evolving in India, methods of 
preconception sex selection became available on the market, namely in vitro 
fertilization (“IVF”).150 
In 2002, recognizing this gap and responding to the Indian Supreme Court 
orders,151 the Indian Parliament amended the PNDT, changing its title to “The 
Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex 
Selection) Act” (“PCPNDT”).152 The PCPNDT (among other things) increases 
the penalties and other regulations targeted at clinics.153 The PCPNDT does 
not ban the abortion of female fetuses, but by limiting information about the 
sex of the fetus, its objective is to prevent sex-selective abortions.154 
The law banning sex determination is often flouted. Ultrasound 
technology, the desire to have fewer children, and a preference to have at least 
one son lead many women each year to illegally learn the sex of their fetuses 
and to abort female fetuses. According to the Indian census, the ratio of boys to 
girls became more skewed toward males even after the prohibition on sex 
determination was enacted.155 There is less agreement today among feminist 
 
 146. See Bijayalaxmi Nanda, Campaign Against Female Foeticide: Perspectives, Strategies and 
Experiences, in SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION IN INDIA: GENDER, SOCIETY AND NEW REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES 357, 361 (Tulsi Patel ed., 2007). 
 147. See id. 
 148. The Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994, 
(India).  
 149. Id. 
 150. See generally KPMG & FED’N INDIAN CHAMBERS COM. & INDUS., MEDICAL VALUE 
TRAVEL IN INDIA (2014), http://www.travelbizmonitor.com/images/kpmg_ficci_heal_sep_2014 
_271014.pdf [https://perma.cc/W6D4-N4NM] (“Many Indian hospitals now have modern 
technologies/treatments available with . . . in vitro fertilization options.”). 
 151. See Ctr. for Enquiry into Health and Allied Themes (CEHAT) v. Union of India, (2003) 8 
SCC 412 (India). 
 152. The Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Amendment 
Act, 2003, (India). 
 153. Id. 
 154. See SINGH, supra note 119, at 58. 
 155. See The Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation and Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994, 
(India); Gender Composition, OFF. REGISTRAR GEN. & CENSUS COMM’R, INDIA, 
http://censusindia.gov.in/Census_And_You/gender_composition.aspx [https://perma.cc/CT64-
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groups about whether these restrictions should remain in effect than there was 
decades ago.156 
2.  Pro-Choice Support for Abortion Prohibitions in the United States 
Although pro-choice people, lawyers, and organizations rarely support 
restrictions on abortion, the situation is different with sex-selective abortion 
bans. Legislative representatives who are typically opposed to restrictions on 
abortion appear to have accepted the narrative on sex selection in the United 
States. 
In 2012, when the majority of the U.S. House of Representatives voted in 
favor of a federal law prohibiting sex-selective abortion, twenty Democrats 
voted with the majority.157 One of those Democrats who voted to prohibit sex-
selective abortion, Representative John Garamendi from California, stated that 
“[he is] a strong pro-choice feminist and a proud father of 5 daughters and 3 
granddaughters!”158 His official position further stated that “[his] daughters and 
wife are [his] closest advisors and confidants and all of [his] decisions are heavily 
weighed by their influence.”159 In addition, twenty-five pro-choice Democrats 
and on-the-fence Democrats voted in favor of adopting restrictions on sex-
selective abortion in Oklahoma.160 
Major legal and other advocacy groups that work on the national stage to 
support abortion rights have not spoken out against the laws. In challenging 
Pennsylvania’s abortion statutes, Planned Parenthood failed to bring to the 
Supreme Court’s attention the prohibition on sex selection adopted by 
Pennsylvania161 in what later was to become an important abortion decision: 
 
MDRZ] (“At the Census 2001, sex ratio of the population in the age group 0-6 years has been registered 
as 927, in India, declining from 945 in 1991 and 962 in 1981.”). 
 156. Compare Maneesha Deckha, (Not) Reproducing the Cultural, Racial and Embodied Other: A 
Feminist Response to Canada’s Partial Ban on Sex Selection, 16 UCLA WOMEN’S L.J. 1, 25–26 (2007) 
(describing Uma Narayan’s conception of the criminalization of sex-selection abortion as a “Dupe of 
Patriarchy”), with Anita Jain, Sex Selection and Abortion in India: Efforts To Curb Sex Selection Must Not 
Retard Progressive Safe Abortion Policies, 346 BRIT. MED. J. 8, 8 (2013) (arguing that restrictions on sex 
selective abortions do not curb the problem of sex selection), and Sital Kalantry, Sex Selection in the 
United States and India: A Contextualist Feminist Approach, 18 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 61, 
84–85 (2013) (arguing that restrictions on sex selective abortion may be permissible if an imbalanced 
sex ratio impacts women as a group).  
 157. Kate Sheppard, House GOP’s ‘Prenatal Nondiscrimination’ Bill Fails, MOTHER JONES 
(May  31,  2012), https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2012/05/house-gop-abortion-sex-selection 
[https://perma.cc/4JY3-TBWB]. 
 158. John Garamendi, John Garamendi on Abortion, ON THE ISSUES, https://www.ontheissues.org/ 
CA/John_Garamendi_Abortion.htm [https://perma.cc/KTU6-Y36Z] (last updated May 30, 2020). 
 159. Id. 
 160. See KALANTRY, WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS AND MIGRATION supra note 134, at 85–87. 
 161. Box v. Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky, Inc., 139 S. Ct. 1780, 1792 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (citing Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 844 
(1992)). 
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Planned Parenthood v. Casey.162 Even though these prohibitions were the second 
most introduced anti-abortion legislation in 2012, no prominent163 pro-choice 
organization is devoting significant attention to the issue. 164  The single 
organization that has included sex-selective abortion bans in their main 
advocacy is focused on the rights of Asian American and Pacific Islander 
women.165 Until advocates, collaborating with the clinic I directed, brought a 
comparative approach into the conversation, pro-choice groups largely accepted 
the claim that sex selection is widespread among immigrants.166 
B. Limitations of Human Rights Frameworks 
Advocates, lawyers, and activists who are involved in issues concerning 
women’s equality are often guided by international human rights frameworks.167 
Much of human rights law and theory advances the universal applicability of 
laws.168 The universal lens tends to favor the free movement of laws across 
borders without critical evaluation. Under a universalist view, it would be 
appropriate for a law that was designed to prevent a human rights problem in 
one country to be adopted by another country without critical reflection. This 
section explains how and why this universalist approach has led to a 
misunderstanding of sex-selective abortion statutes by some people. 169  The 
alternative to universalism—cultural relativism—is also not suitable to evaluate 
the appropriateness of legal transplantations. 
 
 162. 505 U.S. 833, 844 (1992). 
 163. KALANTRY, WOMEN’S HUMAN RIGHTS AND MIGRATION, supra note 134, at 77. 
 164. For example, the Center for Reproductive Rights website does not mention any recent work 
on sex-selective abortion. A search through their website reveals a single statement on principles against 
sex-selective abortions from 2009. See Statement of Policies and Principles on Discrimination 
Against  Women  and  Sex-Selective  Abortion  Bans,  CTR.  FOR  REPROD.  RTS.  (Sept.  29,  2009), 
https://reproductiverights.org/document/statement-of-policies-and-principles-on-discrimination-
against-women-and-sex-selective-abor [https://perma.cc/S898-R2Y5]. The latest legal action taken by 
the Center on the subject is from 2013. See State Judge Blocks ND Law Designed to Close Only Abortion 
Clinic in the State, CTR. FOR REPROD. RTS. (July 31, 2013), https://reproductiverights.org/press-
room/state-judge-blocks-nd-law-designed-to-close-only-abortion-clinic-in-the-state [https://perma.cc/ 
2773-DE5R] (mentioning as an aside that the Center for Reproductive Rights filed a lawsuit in 
response to North Dakota passing a law banning abortions for reasons of sex selection or genetic fetal 
anomaly).  
 165. Sex-Selective Abortion Bans, NAT’L ASIAN PAC. AM. WOMEN’S F., https://www.napawf.org/ 
reproductive-health-and-rights/sex-selective-abortion-bans [https://perma.cc/B84R-PVEY]. 
 166. RAJANI BHATIA, GENDER BEFORE BIRTH: SEX SELECTION IN A TRANSNATIONAL 
CONTEXT 162–64 (2018). 
 167. Scholarship relating to women’s rights has a rich relationship to practice. See Cynthia Grant 
Bowman & Elizabeth Schneider, Feminist Legal Theory, Feminist Lawmaking, and the Legal Profession, 67 
FORDHAM L. REV. 249, 255–56 (1998). 
 168. But see Shannon Speed & María Teresa Sierra, Critical Perspectives on Human Rights and 
Multiculturalism in Neoliberal Latin America: Introduction, 28 POL. & LEGAL ANTHROPOLOGY REV. 1, 
1–2 (2005) (critiquing the consequences of the spread of human rights and multicultural values).  
 169. See Rainer Arnold, Reflections on the Universality of Human Rights, in THE UNIVERSALISM OF 
HUMAN RIGHTS 1, 1 (Rainer Arnold ed., 2013). 
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United Nations (“UN”) treaties and documents are replete with an 
understanding that all human rights are universal. For example, the 1993 
Vienna Declaration provides that “[a]ll human rights are universal, indivisible 
and interdependent and interrelated.” 170  This broad understanding of 
universalism manifests itself in modern practice. In an example of the 
stronghold of universalist ideas, the World Bank has created indicators to assess 
the status of women’s rights and gender equality around the world. 171  The 
indicators use one definition of domestic violence and valorize one set of 
solutions as appropriate.172 Countries that deviate from this uniform solution 
are thought to be doing too little to eradicate violence against women.173 
Nongovernmental organizations also apply universalist approaches to 
human rights issues across their different country areas. For example, “Amnesty 
International objected to the [European Court of Human Rights’] failure to 
find that France’s full-face ban violated the European Convention of Human 
Rights and also objected when that same court failed to hold that Turkey’s ban 
on headscarves in universities violated that Convention.” 174  Amnesty 
International did not appear to consider it relevant that in Turkey—a Muslim-
majority country—a prohibition on headscarves could potentially promote 
women’s equality.175 In France, by comparison, the full-face veil prohibition 
targeted a minority group in the context of growing Islamophobia.176 Thus, it 
could have been acceptable to ban headscarves in Turkey to promote women’s 
equality, but a restriction on full-face veils would not promote the same goal in 
France.177 
International human rights organizations are reluctant to deviate from the 
principle of universality, in part because it gives their positions moral 
 
 170. World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 
¶ 5,  U.N. Doc.  A/CONF.157/23  (July  12,  1993),  https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b39ec.html 
[https://perma.cc/D7CF-ME57]. 
 171. See THE WORLD BANK & INT’L FIN. CORP., WOMEN, BUSINESS AND THE 
LAW  2014:  REMOVING  RESTRICTIONS  TO  ENHANCE GENDER  EQUALITY  3–5  (2013), 
http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/893551468147874555/pdf/922710PUB0v20W00Box3853
55B00PUBLIC0.pdf [https://perma.cc/VWX3-HTTH]. 
 172. See id. at 24–26. 
 173. See id. at 27–28. 
 174. Sital Kalantry, The French Veil Ban: A Transnational Legal Feminist Approach, 46 U. BALT. L. 
REV. 201, 233 (2017) [hereinafter Kalantry, The French Veil Ban]; see European Court Ruling on Full-Face 
Veils Punishes Women for Expressing Their Beliefs, AMNESTY INT’L (July 1, 2014), 
https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2014/07/european-court-ruling-full-face-veils-punishes-
women-expressing-their-religion/ [https://perma.cc/ZFZ4-62V6]; Turkey Violates Freedom of Religion 
with Headscarf Ban: Amnesty, WORLD BULL. (Apr. 24, 2012), https://www.worldbulletin.net/general/ 
turkey-violates-freedom-of-religion-with-headscarf-ban-amnesty-h88969.html [https://perma.cc/ 
DLL2-7MVT]. 
 175. Kalantry, The French Veil Ban, supra note 174, at 231. 
 176. Id. at 220–22. 
 177. Id. at 229–30. 
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authority.178 “The supporters of universalism often draw upon natural law and 
reason and argue that there are objective standards by which to judge human 
conduct and to create law.”179 For the universalist, everyone is protected by 
human rights, and the content of those rights is largely the same across the 
world.180 When a practice is seen to be contrary to a right in one context, then 
a similar practice that emerges elsewhere is also seen to violate that universal 
right.181 Thus, legal solutions designed to address human rights concerns in one 
country can be transferred across countries without critical evaluation. 
Anti-abortion advocates capitalized on universal ideas that are prevalent 
in organizations such as the UN. An interagency statement signed by numerous 
agencies of the UN stated that “[i]mbalanced sex ratios are . . . unacceptable 
manifestation[s] of gender discrimination against girls and women and a 
violation of . . . human rights.”182 The UN report, however, does not distinguish 
the impacts and harms of the practice of sex selection in a country where it is 
widespread from a country where it rarely occurs.183 This lack of distinction 
allows statements by UN bodies to be co-opted by anti-abortion groups in the 
United States. For example, the prohibition on sex-selective abortion 
introduced in the U.S. Congress in 2015 states that “[t]he United Nations 
Commission on the Status of Women has urged governments of all nations ‘to 
take necessary measures to prevent . . . prenatal sex selection.’”184 Because of 
the UN’s failure to clarify that sex-selective abortion could vary by jurisdiction, 
anti-abortion advocates are able to use the UN’s universalist position as a way 
to promote limitations on abortion in the United States. 
Cultural relativism is often presented as an alternative approach to 
universalism in human rights.185 A cultural relativist would “assert that culture 
 
 178. See Jack Donnelly, Cultural Relativism and Universal Human Rights, 6 HUM. RTS. Q. 400, 414 
(1984); see also Jack Donnelly, The Relative Universality of Human Rights, 29 HUM. RTS. Q. 281, 289–
291 (2007) (exploring “several different senses of ‘universal’ human rights”). 
 179. Kalantry, The French Veil Ban, supra note 174, at 208; see R. H. Helmholz, Natural Law and 
Human Rights in English Law: From Bracton to Blackstone, 3 AVE MARIA L. REV. 1, 1–2 (2005). 
 180. Nancy Kim, Toward a Feminist Theory of Human Rights: Straddling the Fence Between Western 
Imperialism and Uncritical Absolutism, 25 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 49, 63–64 (1993). 
 181. Kalantry, The French Veil Ban, supra note 174, at 207–08. 
 182. OFF. OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMM’R FOR HUM. RTS, UNITED NATION 
POPULATION FUND, THE UNITED NATIONS CHILD.’S FUND, UNITED NATIONS ENTITY FOR 
GENDER EQUAL. & THE EMPOWERMENT OF WOMEN, & WORLD HEALTH ORG., PREVENTING 
GENDER-BIASED SEX SELECTION 12 (2011), https://www.unfpa.org/sites/default/files/resource-
pdf/Preventing_gender-biased_sex_selection.pdf [https://perma.cc/G8BV-GUCM]. 
 183. See generally id. (failing to differentiate the impacts of sex selection in varying countries). 
 184. Prenatal Nondiscrimination Act of 2015, S. 48, 114th Cong. § 2(a)(8) (2015). 
 185. See Dianne Otto, Rethinking the “Universality” of Human Rights Law, 29 COLUM. HUM. RTS. 
L. REV. 1, 8 (1997) (“In contemporary debates, the ‘universalists,’ who are primarily Northern states, 
predict that even the slightest ‘dilution’ of universalism will give the green light to tyrannical 
governments, torturers, and mutilators of women.”). Cyra Akila Choudhury argues that the liberal 
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See Cyra Akila Choudhury, Beyond Culture: Human Rights Universalisms Versus Religious and Cultural 
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is the sole or primary source of the validity of a practice or claim to a moral 
right.”186 In an extreme form of cultural relativism, human rights are defined by 
religion and culture and, as a result, can vary across contexts.187 For example, in 
Saudi Arabia, every woman must have a male guardian and needs that 
guardian’s consent to marry, travel, and engage in other activities.188 While this 
kind of system would be rejected under mainstream human rights standards, 
Saudi Arabia might justify this law on the basis of their religion or culture. A 
cultural relativist position would allow them to claim that the guardian law is 
appropriate because it is consistent with their understanding of women’s rights. 
Some nation-states have actively used cultural relativism to justify 
unquestionably repressive practices.189 
When the universalist/cultural relativist debate is applied to problematic 
practices that migrate around the globe, the theories offer two inadequate 
approaches. The universalist approach in its extreme form posits that legal 
responses to practices that violate human rights in one country can be 
uncritically transported to other countries. On the other hand, cultural relativist 
approaches leave little room for any universal standards at all and, as a result, 
have been used to deny basic human rights to women. 
Modern comparative approaches, on the other hand, offer a way out of the 
debate. It does not have a dog in the fight on the question of whether or not 
laws should be universally transported across borders. Comparative approaches 
instead provide a methodology to determine when it is appropriate for laws to 
move from one jurisdiction to another.190 
 
Relativism in the Activism for Gender Justice, 30 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 226, 239–43 (2015) 
(“[B]oth assume that culture as a social construct is essential and immutable.”). 
 186. Kim, supra note 180, at 56. 
 187. Id. at 59; see Kalantry, The French Veil Ban, supra note 174, at 213. 
 188. Boxed In: Women and Saudi Arabia’s Male Guardianship System, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 16, 
2016), https://www.hrw.org/report/2016/07/16/boxed/women-and-saudi-arabias-male-guardianship-
system# [https://perma.cc/C8GK-9QQS]. 
 189. Eva Brems, Enemies or Allies? Feminism and Cultural Relativism as Dissident Voices in Human 
Rights Discourse, 19 HUM. RTS. Q. 136, 149 (1997). It should be noted that at least one scholar has 
attempted to bridge the extremes of cultural relativism and universalism. One author proposed certain 
situations where cultural values could be prioritized over universal rights. Burns H. Weston, The 
Universality of Human Rights in a Multicultural World, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD 
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 190. See infra Section V.A and accompanying text.  
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Some post-colonial feminists191 and feminist legal scholars have recognized 
the value of comparative approaches to gender rights across the globe. 192 
Karmina Bennoune, for example, suggests that practices can have different 
implications for women’s equality depending on the context of the country in 
which they arise.193 She points to the error in assuming that banning Muslim 
women’s veils 194  always promotes women’s equality in every context. 195 
Bennoune elaborates that, to really understand how a practice (in this case, 
veiling) impacts women’s equality and, relatedly, whether bans on veiling 
promote women’s equality or not, one must evaluate the practice in the 
historical, political, and other contexts in which it emerges.196 
Bennoune’s framework challenges the consensus in favor of universalism, 
suggesting that a law in one context may promote women’s equality, but similar 
regulations on women’s behavior in other contexts may undermine it.197 This 
perspective is open to the idea that countries with seemingly similar practices 
can adopt differing legal solutions to them. 
Some human rights and feminist scholars and activists may resist 
abandoning universality because they might view it as a wholesale rejection of 
any common vision of equality. Tracy Higgins warns that “the challenge is 
 
 191. Post-colonial and gender studies scholar Chandra Mohanty, in her seminal critique of 
Western feminism, elaborated upon the idea that a practice like veiling can signify different things in 
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(2007). 
 194. “Veil” here is meant to encompass multiple different types of clothing. This includes a loose 
headscarf, a cloth that covers all the hair, or a full-face covering, and it could refer to a loose black cloth 
covering the entire body. See Russell Goldman, What’s That You’re Wearing? A Guide to Muslim Veils, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/04/world/what-in-the-world/burqa-
hijab-abaya-chador.html [https://perma.cc/XJ5Q-E8HZ (dark archive)]; James Vyver, Explainer: Why 
Do Muslim Women Wear a Burka, Niqab or Hijab?, AUSTL. BROAD. CORP. (Aug. 17, 2017, 3:58 AM), 
http://www.abc.net.au/news/2014-09-23/why-do-muslim-women-wear-a-burka-niqab-or-
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 195. Bennoune, supra note 193, at 368. 
 196. Id. at 396. 
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simultaneously to reject universalist human rights claims that fail to account for 
difference and to embrace a normative conception of gender justice that is 
critical of patriarchy across cultures.”198 But I do not think that being attuned 
to the need for differing legal responses to similar practices when they emerge 
in different jurisdictions constitutes the wholesale acceptance of cultural 
relativism. In a similar vein, Cyra Akila Choudhury argues that liberal feminism 
needs a more nuanced lens in today’s global world.199 She suggests that if liberal 
feminism “wants to be relevant to the lives of women beyond the Westernized 
elite, it will have to take difference seriously and translate its ideas into ones 
that appeal broadly.”200 
It should be noted that universal approaches to legal solutions also appear 
beyond human rights law. For example, when it comes to corporate law or other 
law, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) have also 
proposed nearly universal solutions across borders. In the next part, I articulate 
a multidirectional and contextual comparative approach to evaluate whether 
sex-selective abortion should be adopted in the United States. 
V.  COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO SEX-SELECTIVE ABORTION LAWS 
Scholarship on legal transplants has largely been that of a distant observer 
of legal migration in practice. The scholarship has been either critical of laws 
migrating across borders201 or not critical of it at all.202 Legal scholars, however, 
have not paid significant attention to developing methods that can guide 
lawyers and practitioners who are considering transplanting laws. 
In Section V.A below, I propose a contextual 203  and multidirectional 
approach to evaluate whether or not a law should be transplanted. Although the 
need for a multidirectional and contextual approach is easier to see when we 
examine a reverse legal transplant, this approach should be used when people 
are considering any kind of transplant—a reverse, horizontal, or traditional legal 
transplant. 
In Section V.B, I apply the framework to a case study of sex-selective 
abortion laws. I hope the analysis will also assist lawmakers who are considering 
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adopting sex-selective abortion statutes and judges who are considering their 
constitutionality. 
A. Toward a Multidirectional and Contextual Comparative Law Approach 
In most cases, scholars evaluating the success of transplants have only done 
so after the fact. In determining whether a transplant is successful, scholars have 
asked whether it has “taken hold” or been implemented in a society.204 As a 
result, in evaluating the “success” of legal transplants, authors have tended to 
focus on factors in the reception country and have ignored important factors in 
the country of its origin that would help determine whether the law should be 
transplanted in the first place. 
Berkowitz, Pistor, and Richard concluded that the success of a legal 
transplant depends on whether the transplant was voluntary or forcefully 
imposed and whether the transplant’s country of destination adapted the law to 
local conditions.205 Along these same lines, other authors have also focused on 
the reception country, finding that the key determinants of the success of a legal 
transplant are the degree of engagement of indigenous populations in local rule 
and legislative bodies, and the extent to which indigenous rules are integrated 
into court systems.206 
One reason for this lack of emphasis on the country of origin might relate 
to the fact that most transplants move from Global North countries to Global 
South countries.207 Authors might assume that the country of origin of the 
law—typically, a Global North country—has a more developed legal regime 
than the country of destination of the law, typically a Global South country. 
They thus assume that the legal transplants represent “best practices.” 
Consequently, the only question they are then concerned with is whether the 
context of the developing country is ready for those laws. 
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In addition, traditional comparative law approaches to transplants de-
emphasize the role of context. Indeed, Watson argued that there is no need for 
laws in certain areas to be sensitive to society or context.208 According to this 
view, laws easily move from one context to another without the need for critical 
evaluation.209 His contemporary, Kahn-Freund, on the other hand, argued that 
laws should be transplanted only if certain conditions are met.210 But he too 
only stressed that factors in the country of destination of the legal transplant 
mattered to evaluating its success or failure. 211  He specifically identified 
political institutions and the interests of the powerful as being relevant to 
determine whether or not it was appropriate to transplant a legal norm. 212 
Although Watson’s view has been universally rejected among scholars, Kahn-
Freund’s approach to evaluating legal transplants should also be broadened.213 
Inga Markovits argues that the nature of the law being transplanted is 
important in determining its success or failure.214 She argues that legal rules 
that do not require any citizen action, such as abolition of the death penalty, are 
more likely to be incorporated into foreign legal systems.215 Laws that have 
more institutional support and personnel on the ground are more likely to be 
successful.216 On the other hand, laws that require the cooperation of people 
will fail if they are out of sync with the deeply held moral views of the people. 
Law reform that corresponds to common habits and beliefs of the people are 
more likely to take hold.217 
Markovits rightly turns her attention to a deep study of the culture, 
society, history, and politics of the reception country as an important variable 
in determining the success of a transplant. Her work adds an important layer of 
complexity to transplant analysis by exposing the correlation between the 
success of a transplant and the type of legal rule or institution being 
transplanted. 
She moves us in the direction of examining the goals, history, and context 
of the country of origin of a law in determining if a transplant of that law will 
be successful. In discussing the failure of Germany’s use of U.S.-style 
bankruptcy laws, she points us to the rationale and goals of the law in the United 
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States—it is meant to give control and power to debtors. The law in question 
did not succeed in Germany because it was inconsistent with German culture 
that frowns upon relieving debtors of their obligations.218 
All of the studies about the success or failure of transplants described 
above have aimed to examine laws after they have already been transplanted. 
Their goal has not been to develop methods for determining when it is 
appropriate to transplant laws in the first place. In other words, they have not 
attempted to articulate methods that will assist lawyers, lawmakers, and other 
potential transplanters in evaluating when they should borrow laws or impose 
their laws on others. Success of a law should not just be defined by whether or 
not it is implemented. In many countries, most legislation that is adopted will 
be implemented, and mere implementation does not mean that the transplant 
was appropriate. Sex-selective abortion statutes are examples of such legislation. 
In examining whether or not sex-selective abortion statutes will meet the 
goals in the United States for which they were designed in India, we must 
broaden the analysis to include the context of the originating country. At first 
glance, it might seem that because the restrictions on sex selection in India were 
meant to promote gender equality, they would have the same impact in the 
United States. However, without more than a surface-level understanding of 
the goals of the law and the practice the laws in India seek to address, we are 
not able to determine whether they will address the same problems and achieve 
the same goals when adopted in the United States. 
In addition to shining a light on factors in the country of origin, 
comparative approaches to legal transplants should be expanded by examining 
a broader array of factors both in the country of origin and destination of the 
transplant. Even those authors who have emphasized context looked only at a 
narrow set of factors. Kahn-Freund, for example, placed great emphasis on 
political factors, such as political institutions and the interests of the powerful, 
as the relevant unit to determine whether it was appropriate to transplant a legal 
norm.219 
Thus, in evaluating whether a law should be transplanted at all, it is 
necessary to identify and compare (1) the structural social, cultural, economic, 
and other background factors in the country of origin that gave rise to the law 
and their existence or absence in the country of destination; and (2) the 
prevalence, intent, and consequences of the harm that the transplant proposes 
to address in both the country of origin and country of destination. 
This multidirectional and contextual comparative approach to evaluating 
reverse legal transplants should be employed when determining whether any 
transplant is appropriate, including traditional, reverse, and horizontal legal 
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transplants. The legal transplant of French company takeover law to Egypt is 
an example of how a multidirectional and more contextual approach would have 
better assisted in evaluating whether or not the company takeover law should 
have been transplanted.220 In France, takeover law is protective of businesses 
and was designed to protect its nation’s investments from foreign takeovers.221 
On the other hand, Egypt was not seeking to protect investors but to promote 
investments. A takeover law that made it easier (rather than harder) for 
investors to gain control of corporations was more likely to promote economic 
development.222 
Thus, although the French version of the law was consistent with the 
economic priorities of France, the law failed when it was transplanted to Egypt 
because it was inconsistent with Egypt’s priority to grow its economy. 223 
Instead of adopting the law just because it was from a Global North country, 
Egypt’s goals would have been better served by trying to understand the reasons 
behind French company takeover law. Transplanting French company takeover 
law to Egypt failed because the goals for which French takeover law was 
designed did not match Egypt’s goals.224 Had actors in Egypt examined the 
reasons for why the law developed in France, they may never have transplanted 
it to Egypt. 
The comparative law approach identified here might also benefit judges in 
determining when, which, and for what purpose foreign cases should be used in 
their decisions. Liberals have strongly embraced the use of foreign precedent 
by judges, 225  but the use of foreign precedent can also undercut their 
commitments. 226  When the debates on foreign precedent heated up in the 
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international law scholarship, the U.S. Supreme Court had referred to foreign 
cases for the purpose of advancing gay rights and protections for criminal 
defendants.227 The case study on sex-selective abortion demonstrates the need 
for consistent principles in analyzing whether transplanting foreign law is 
necessary, rather than blindly accepting transplants. 
In the following section, I evaluate whether the restrictions on sex-
selective abortion being introduced and adopted in many U.S. states will 
achieve the same goals that the restrictions on sex selection in India were 
designed to achieve and whether the laws being proposed in the United States 
even address a similar problem. 
B. Evaluating Sex-Selective Abortion Laws 
In evaluating legal transplants, Section V.A above shows that it is 
important to identify and compare both (1) the social, cultural, economic, and 
other background factors of the country of origin and country of destination; 
and (2) the prevalence, intent, consequences, and other salient factors in regard 
to the practice that the reverse legal transplant proposes to address in both the 
country of origin and country of destination. This section provides background 
on sex-selective abortion regulations in India and evaluates sex-selective 
abortion laws in the United States using this perspective to determine whether 
they will enhance gender equality as they were designed to do in India. 
1.  Examining and Comparing Structural Factors  
Giving Rise to the Practice in India 
There are many cultural reasons advanced for why some Indian women 
abort female fetuses. First, patrilocal marriages, where a couple settles into the 
husband’s family’s home, are the norm in India.228 As a result of this custom, a 
daughter is thought to be paraya dhan (someone else’s wealth).229 Sons are the 
ones who are assumed to be breadwinners for the families.230 The lack of a 
pension system in India leads parents to rely on the son to provide financial 
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support during old age.231 On the other hand, there are strong norms in some 
communities against families taking money or any support from a married 
daughter.232 To the extent a woman earns an income outside of her household, 
she will often be expected to keep her earnings within the husband’s family. 
Second, the tradition that a bride’s family must give large gifts to a 
groom’s family is another reason for sex selection. Although dowry is prohibited 
under the Dowry Prohibition Act of 1961, the practice continues today.233 As a 
result, when a woman gets married, her parents often have to pay money 
(sometimes large sums in relation to their income) to the groom’s family.234 For 
poor parents, having to provide a dowry when a daughter marries is often 
economically challenging.235 
Third, while dowry may not be as much of a financial burden for wealthier 
families, parents may desire sons to perpetuate their family name and to inherit 
their parents’ money. Parents are sometimes reluctant to leave money to their 
daughters because it will potentially be controlled by their daughters’ 
husbands.236 
Fourth, the desire to have a son instead of a daughter is often attributed 
to Hindu religious traditions. Many Hindus believe that only sons should light 
the funeral pyre of their parents and that moksha (liberation from the cycle of 
rebirth and reincarnation) is only possible through their sons.237 
There are also structural factors that have contributed to the high rates of 
sex-selective abortion. There has been a decrease in overall fertility in India.238 
The UN Population Division estimated that the fertility rate in the 1950s was 
5.9 children per woman in India.239 By 2009, fertility in India had declined to 
2.6 children per woman, less than half the rate of the early 1950s.240 There are 
a host of reasons for the desire for smaller family sizes. Some argue that as 
agrarian modes of production become less prevalent (where the labor of children 
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might have been important), people have fewer children. 241 In urban areas, 
increasing prices and cost of living encourages people to have smaller 
families.242 
Governmental policies provide another reason for the changing family size 
norms. While most people know about China’s prior one-child policy,243 few 
are aware of the coercive policies adopted by Indian state governments to 
enforce a two-child norm model. In pursuit of the goal of smaller families, 
certain states have adopted laws barring people with more than two children 
from holding posts in local governing bodies.244 
The social, cultural, economic, and other factors that give rise to sex 
selection in India do not exist in the United States. Some argue that the practice 
of dowry causes people to prefer sons,245 but this practice is not common in the 
United States, even among immigrants. Families in the United States often 
share the costs of marriage. Others argue that in India, parents want to have at 
least one son because they rely on their sons for support in old age, given the 
lack of a national healthcare system for retirees.246 
Another argument advanced to explain the preference for sons in India is 
the patrilocal system, where the daughter leaves her parents’ family and moves 
in with her husband’s family after marriage.247 In the United States, in contrast, 
only 0.7% of households include a parent-in-law, son-in-law, or daughter-in-
law.248 
Finally, in India, although property laws allow for inheritance by 
daughters, in practice that does not occur.249 Daughters are often pressured by 
their fathers, mothers, and brothers to relinquish any claims to their share of 
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paternal and maternal wealth. 250  In the United States, daughters are not 
generally disinherited just because they are female.251 
Thus, most of the societal factors that encourage sex selection in India 
relate to sexist norms and institutions that do not, for the most part, exist in the 
United States.252 To the extent the practice occurs in the United States, it is not 
a result of larger societal norms and institutions that discriminate against 
women.253 
2.  Examining and Comparing the Prevalence, Intent,  
and Consequences of the Behavior 
In examining the prevalence, intent, and consequences of the practice in 
both the country of origin and country of destination of the reverse legal 
transplant, it becomes obvious that the practice of sex-selective abortion does 
not carry the same connotation in the United States for gender equality.254 It is 
estimated that over fifty million women and girls are missing in India as a result 
of sex-selective abortion, as well as other causes, such as malnutrition and 
neglect.255 On the other hand, in the United States, the largest estimates suggest 
that there are approximately one thousand to two thousand missing women and 
girls. 256  The widespread nature of the practice in India makes it more 
problematic for women’s equality. 
To understand the harm caused by a practice, it is sometimes helpful to 
ascertain the motive for the practice. In India, based on an analysis of sex ratios, 
it is safe to assume that people select for sex because they want to have a son 
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and also have fewer children.257 As noted above, societal factors that drive sex 
selection in India are largely absent in the United States. Thus, when Indian 
families do use sex selection to have a boy, they could be doing it because of 
their cultural desires. An analysis of U.S. census birth data of Asian Americans 
paints a more complicated picture. Working with economists, we found that 
when certain groups of Asian Americans have two sons, their third child is more 
likely to be a girl as compared to White Americans.258 This suggests that, to the 
extent a small number of people in the United States are using some method of 
sex selection, they are doing so to have girls in some cases and boys in other 
cases. While many object to sex selection for any reason,259 it carries a different 
implication when targeting females than when it is being used for purposes of 
family balancing. Further, any sex selection targeted at reducing the births of 
girls for sexist reasons could have symbolic harms for girls and women. 
In addition, in a random national survey of one thousand people in the 
United States on their preferences with regard to the gender of their children, 
I found that Asian Americans—more than any other racial or ethnic group in 
the United States—were more likely to want to have one boy and one girl if 
they could have children. Sixty percent of Asian Americans desired one boy and 
one girl, while less than fifty percent of White Americans desired one boy and 
one girl.260 This suggests that, to the extent people do sex select, they might be 
doing it to serve different goals than to obtain only sons. 
The consequences of a practice are also relevant to determining its harm. 
The consequences of sex-selective abortion in India are very different than in 
the United States. Part of the reason Indian feminists object to sex selection 
against girls is that they believe it occurs as a result of unequal societal 
institutions and that the practice perpetuates those institutions. 261  The 
widespread practice makes girls in society feel less valuable. 
Moreover, emerging empirical studies have found that the male surplus is 
harming women in other ways. Recent studies suggest that there are higher 
levels of sexual harassment, rape, and early child marriage in districts where 
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there is greater sex selection.262 One study found some correlation between 
domestic violence and the shortage of women. Using survey data from the 
National Family and Health Survey, the study found that a low community sex 
ratio is associated with a higher likelihood of wives being punched by their 
husbands.263 Furthermore, wives in communities with a sex ratio imbalance in 
favor of men are more likely to be slapped, pushed, or shaken.264 The authors 
conclude that “in a patriarchal society such as India a relative shortage of women 
will encourage men to resort to violence and control to constrain women’s 
interactions with other nonrelated men and to confine women to traditional 
roles as wives and mothers.” 265  In contrast, we do not observe the same 
consequences of sex selection in the United States. 
Thus, when seen through a multidirectional and contextual comparative 
lens, it becomes clear that the practice of sex-selective abortion is carried out in 
a way that is problematic from a perspective of women’s equality in India but 
not similarly so—and probably much less so—in the United States. In India, 
sex selection occurs because of certain social, economic, and historical factors 
and further perpetuates unequal social institutions. The practice harms girls and 
women both in terms of the implication it carries that girls and women are less 
valued and because of the actual harms that some empirical studies have 
documented in India as a result of a shortage of women. 
To further illustrate my points, it is useful to consider two examples of sex 
selection undertaken in different contexts. Take the case of an Indian woman 
living in India who takes steps to have a boy after having a girl, and the case of 
a woman of Indian descent in the United States who takes steps to have a boy 
after having a girl. The first scenario raises different concerns than the second 
one. Social institutions such as dowry, patrilocal forms of marriage, and fewer 
economic opportunities for girls are some reasons why families may want to 
have at least one son in India. When families play into this tradition, they 
further perpetuate and reinforce those customs. In addition, because so many 
people have aborted girl fetuses, the shortage of women has been shown by 
empirical studies to cause actual harm to women.266 
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In the case of an immigrant woman in the United States, the context in 
which her act occurs is different. She will not likely be required to pay money 
to a groom to marry her daughter, and she can rely on social security and other 
state support rather than relying solely on her son for economic support in old 
age. Further, there is no prevailing custom against daughters providing 
economic support, though perhaps certain Indian American parents might resist 
taking any financial support from their daughter. A daughter born in the United 
States may have more economic opportunities for self-sufficiency than one born 
in India. 
Thus, societal institutions and norms do not encourage sex-selective 
abortion nor does the practice perpetuate sexist institutions and norms. Large 
numbers of people in the United States are not systematically selecting in favor 
of boys. Though the knowledge that sex-selective abortions of female fetuses 
occur even in the United States may cause symbolic harms within a family and 
community, given that there is no surplus of males in the United States, there 
are no consequences that relate to imbalanced sex ratios (such as increased 
sexual harassment and rape). Even though violence against women is prevalent 
in the United States, there is no correlation between that violence and sex 
selection in the same way as has been identified in India. Moreover, the few 
Asian American people who are using IVF or other means of sex selection may 
be doing so to ensure they have at least one boy and at least one girl. 
In sum, a multidirectional and contextual comparative examination 
suggests that importing a law from India to the United States will not meet the 
goal for which the law was designed in India: to promote women’s equality. 
While the nature of the practice and societal context in which it occurs in India 
is problematic from the perspective of equality for women, it does not have the 
same impact in the United States. Indeed, migrating such a law would harm 
women’s rights to access reproductive care by imposing hurdles on women 
seeking to terminate their pregnancy for nonselective reasons. 267  Thus, a 
comparative approach makes it obvious that restrictions on sex-selective 
abortion were adopted for entirely different reasons in India, and the practice 
in the United States is vastly different. As a result, the limitations will not serve 
the purposes of enhancing gender equality as they were initially believed to do 
by some legislators. 
CONCLUSION 
During early modern history, colonial powers forced their colonies to 
adopt legal regimes based on their own legal systems. This was part of the larger 
project of dominating and controlling their weaker colonies. In the 
contemporary era, however, one might expect laws, institutions, and legal 
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procedures to flow more organically. Governmental entities and individuals 
drafting laws or creating new policies might research and adopt laws from a host 
of other countries. However, a review of the legal transplant literature 
demonstrates that authors have tended to only document transplants from 
Global North countries to Global South countries and horizontally from 
countries with similar levels of economic growth. But they have not observed 
many migrations from a Global South country to a Global North country. This 
is likely because many reverse legal transplants do not occur in practice. 
Alternatively, it could be that there is a plethora of reverse legal transplants in 
practice, but scholars have chosen not to write about them. In that unlikely case, 
transplant scholarship should begin to expand to document the multiple ways 
in which law travels. 
One likely explanation for the lack of Global South to Global North 
transplants is that, while Global North countries have institutions, donors, and 
governmental entities that fund the work of exporting laws, similar 
organizations are rare in Global South countries. Another possible explanation 
for the dearth of reverse legal transplants is the assumption that laws from 
countries that have economies with higher per-capita production are legally 
mature and ought to be exported to economically weaker countries. 
Alternatively, the laws of countries with lower per-capita production are not 
viewed as worth borrowing. These assumptions place too great of an emphasis 
on law as a vehicle of economic growth and too little emphasis on other goals 
of law, including promoting social justice and environmental protection. When 
norms do migrate in the reverse, they typically relate to the regulation of 
immigrants’ or other minority groups’ behavior. 
Prior studies consider a legal transplant to be successful if it has been 
implemented by the reception country. The case study on sex-selective abortion 
statutes makes it clear that this inquiry is too narrow. If implementation of the 
law were the only measure of success, then there would be no need to resist 
transplantation of prohibitions on sex selection. It is only by placing the law in 
a comparative perspective that we determine whether or not it is appropriate 
for the United States to adopt a similar legislative response to sex selection as 
India. Examining the law in the Indian context lays bare why adopting the bans 
in the United States will not serve the same purposes for which they were 
designed in India. This analysis should be of interest to legislators who are faced 
with voting on the bills and judges who adjudicate their constitutionality. 
Beyond the case study of the reverse legal transplant, this Article makes 
several important contributions to the transplant literature. First, this Article 
finds from a study of the transplant literature that scholars who write in the 
legal transplant tradition only document transplants that move from Global 
North to Global South. This is likely because there are so few moving the other 
way. While unlikely, it is possible that there are many reverse legal transplants 
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in practice, but scholars have failed to document them. In either case, this 
Article contributes to the literature by presenting a robust case study of a 
reverse legal transplant. 
Second, there is little rigor or consistent usage of the term “legal 
transplant.” This Article attempts to draw boundaries around the concept. It 
uses that definition to guide a review of the transplant literature and to identify 
sex-selective abortions statutes as reverse legal transplants. 
Third, this Article develops a multidirectional and contextual comparative 
methodology that should be employed when policymakers, lawyers, and 
advocates are determining whether or not to transplant a law, legal institution, 
or legal procedure. Learning from the case study of the reverse legal transplant 
of sex-selective abortion bans, it becomes apparent that comparative approaches 
to all transplants (even ones from the Global North to Global South) should be 
broadened. 
Egypt’s use of French company takeover law is an example of where a 
multidirectional and contextual comparative methodology employed prior to 
adoption of the law would have revealed that the law should never have been 
transplanted.268 If the policymakers had examined the rationale and goals of the 
takeover law in France, they might have concluded that it was not appropriate 
for Egypt.269 French takeover law is designed to discourage shareholders from 
taking over companies, but that goal might not serve a less developed country 
like Egypt.270 
Universalist approaches often guide international legal reform efforts, 
particularly in the field of human rights. An extreme version of universalism 
calls for universal legal solutions to similar legal problems that arise across the 
world. Cultural relativism alternatively suggests that it is not possible nor 
normatively desirable for legal solutions to be uniform across jurisdictions. 
Comparative law methods provide a way out of this intractable debate in 
international law. Context-sensitive comparative law methods do not assume 
that legal solutions are applicable across borders (unlike universalism), yet they 
do not reject that possibility (unlike cultural relativism). 
Future research on the directionality of vertical transplants (transplants 
between the international level and domestic law) could be fruitful. 271  For 
example, it would be interesting to ascertain whether laws that travel from the 
international level to nation-states migrate equally to Global North and Global 
South countries or disproportionately only to Global South nations. In 
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addition, it would be interesting to learn which countries’ laws influence the 
development of international law—Global South countries, Global North 
countries, or both? Another area of research that moves beyond transplants 
would examine the use of foreign precedent. Do judges in Global North 
countries rely on case law from other Global North countries or cite to cases 
from Global South countries at the same rates when they use foreign precedent? 
Some might argue that there is a dearth of reverse legal transplants because 
Global North countries do not have the same problems as Global South 
countries. This is a false assumption. A country like India, for example, has 
encountered many similar challenges as the United States, including free speech 
concerns, data privacy issues, affirmative action, and regulation of corporations. 
For example, one author has suggested that the United States and the United 
Kingdom consider allowing corporations to adopt the trusteeship model used 
by large conglomerates in India.272 
Even the highest levels of the U.S. judiciary have acknowledged the 
importance of looking to legal models of Global South countries. In particular, 
the late Justice Ginsburg argued that countries writing modern constitutions 
should look not to the U.S. Constitution but instead to the South African 
Constitution for guidance.273 Global South countries have developed innovative 
solutions to numerous contemporary problems that are, at least, worth 
examining by Global North policymakers and legal reformers. 
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